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[The Editor will be pleased to consider manuscripts if accompanied by stamped and addressed envelopes. He accepts no responsibility, however, for manuscripts submitted to him.]

Events of the Week.

THE Germans have entered Brussels, and the inevitable emotions which follow the fall even of an undefended capital help us to realize all the brutality of this wanton invasion. As a military event, however, there is no glory in such an achievement. The Belgian field army remains in being, and the German march is threatened by two great fortresses on its flanks, Antwerp and Namur. The Belgian retirement without the decisive battle which some correspondents had expected, is said to have been part of the concerted plan of the Allied staffs, and we must suppose that General Joffre has known how to profit by the delay which the Belgians imposed on the German advance. The departure some days ago of the Belgian Government with its archives from Brussels to Antwerp, was a proof that no prolonged or successful resistance was expected at this stage from King Albert's main army.

SAVE only in Belgium, the news from the whole vast field of war is uniformly good. The British Expeditionary Force has reached its allotted station in the North of France, bringing with it immense encouragement to its French comrades. The daring French advance continues in Alsace and Lorraine, and may soon begin to embarrass German plans. The Russians, sooner than was expected, have begun their offensive in East Prussia, and the Servians have scored a victory which seems to have been of some importance in the North-west corner of Serbia, near Shabatz. Japan has entered the Coalition, and there is still reason to hope that Turkey and the Balkan States (save Serbia) will preserve an expectant neutrality. The spirit in this country is resolute and calm, and the fear of grave economic disaster from the war is giving way to a resolve to turn its opportunities to account by the capture of the enemy's trade.

THE events which led up to the abandonment of Brussels can only be guessed through the fog of censored telegrams. The Belgians fought many gallant engagements with the advance guard of the German advance, but in spite of local successes, the names of these little victories on the map showed that they were being driven steadily back on the line of the tidal river Dyle, which flows through Wavre, Louvain, and Malines (Mechlin) to Antwerp. The hottest fighting was at Tirlemont and Aershot, where both sides are said to have faced terrible losses with the utmost gallantry. But the German cavalry was, meanwhile, swinging round on the North through Gheet and Herenthals, and must presently have reached Malines, where it would have cut the retreat of King Albert's field army on Antwerp. This rapid advance of the German right seems to have convinced the Belgian staff that no time could be spared for the defence of their centre. Louvain was abandoned, uncontested, and with its capture the road to Brussels was open. The Civic Guard took train sadly to Ghent, and the Burgomaster, after enjoining calm on the citizens, met the German cavalry on the Louvain road about eleven o'clock on Thursday. Bad though the conduct of the German cavalry is said to have been in Belgian villages, there is no reason to suppose that the occupation of Brussels will be unnecessarily harsh.

OF events along the line of the Meuse we know comparatively little. The fall of the Liège forts is not yet admitted, but there is little doubt that it has taken place, and the Germans claim that General Leman is a prisoner at Cologne. We learn from the story of an Alsatian deserter that the three Army Corps which advanced on Liège on August 3rd were sent forward in haste, only half-mobilized, from which it follows that our first estimates of the German numbers engaged in the assault were exaggerated. The fort of Huy must have been taken with comparative ease, and the German advance across the Meuse has probably followed its bridge, as well as that at Visé. But the great ring-fortress of Namur is intact, and a formidable French force is believed to be in waiting between Namur and Charleroi. Further up the Meuse, repeated attempts by the German Army of the Ardennes to take Dinant have been defeated in bloody encounters, of which one at least ended in the pursuit of a completely beaten enemy by the French cavalry.

FOR the first time since the Crimean War a British army is operating on the Continent. On Monday night the Press Bureau, twelve days behind the Belgian and eight days behind the French newspapers, issued a laconic statement that our Expeditionary Force had landed safely and without a casualty on French soil. Its arrival in three French ports and its progress to the front took place amid the unbounded enthusiasm of the French people. Our men were overwhelmed with gifts of food, tobacco, and flowers, and the two armies are already in a mood of warm comradeship. The French newspapers are full of praise for the physique and bearing of our men, for their costly equipment, and, most of all perhaps,

for the immense fleet of motor vans and lorries, commandeered from tradesmen, which gives the force a mobility new in war. Sir John French made a flying visit to Paris on Friday, paid his respects to President Poincaré, and discovered that he is already a familiar hero to French crowds. He left, as the French press tells us, to join his headquarters in the North of France. The function of the Expeditionary Force has been assigned to it on military grounds, and has not been directly dictated by the political object of safeguarding Belgian neutrality. The first casualty list records the death from heart-failure in a train of Lieutenant-General Sir John Grierson, a brilliant scientific soldier, who was thought to be our most promising general, and three other deaths and two cases of injury, which are all attributed to accident.

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THE right note has been struck with a sure instinct in the instructions which Lord Kitchener has issued for the guidance of the soldiers of our Force. There is no word in it of vituperation or enmity towards the foe, a reserve which contrasts favorably with the Kaiser's speeches. The men are quietly told that they are ordered abroad "to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common enemy." They are exhorted not only to perfect steadiness under fire, but "to maintain the most friendly relations with those whom you are helping in this struggle." The order goes on, "Be invariably courteous, considerate, and kind," bids the men look on looting as a "disgraceful act," and avoid temptations from women and wine, treating all women with perfect courtesy, but avoiding intimacy. It is a high and sober ideal of a soldier's conduct, and we believe that it represents the spirit of the men.

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THE anxious operation of safeguarding the passage of the Expeditionary Force across the Channel has been so far the main duty of the fleet. It was performed with complete success, and apparently with such ample precautions that no interference by the Germans was even attempted. On Wednesday morning the Press Bureau spoke of "a certain liveliness" in the southern area of the North Sea, a phrase which means at the least that our patrolling squadrons have been in touch with German reconnoitring cruisers. The full narrative of the loss of the small cruiser "Amphion" is an impressive story of steadiness and gallantry. When she struck a floating mine, at 6.30 a.m. on August 6th, a sheet of flame enveloped the bridge, which rendered Captain Fox insensible and flung him off the bridge. He picked himself up, and seeing that the ship's back was broken, made his dispositions to rescue the wounded and get the crew together, as the destroyers closed in. There was neither hurry nor confusion, and in twenty minutes after the first shock all who were alive had left the ship. Three minutes later the abandoned cruiser struck another mine. No device of warfare, unless it be the submarine, puts so severe a strain on the moral of a navy as the floating mine; it has done nothing to shake the steadiness of our crews.

* * *

Russia, following a similar policy by Germany and Austria, has taken a momentous step, which reveals at once her Imperial ambitions, and her perception of the value of the moral factor in war. The Grand Duke Nicholas, as Commander-in-Chief, has issued a proclamation in Polish to the Poles, in which he promises them, a century and a half "since the living body of Poland was torn in pieces," the fulfilment of their "sacred

dream." He promises to obliterate the dividing frontiers, and to unite the "Polish peoples conjointly under the sceptre of the Russian Tsars. Under this sceptre Poland will be born again, free in her religion and her language." The document goes on to mention "autonomy," but without defining it, and cautious correspondents suppose that it means not Home Rule, but the creation of Polish County Councils. We discuss elsewhere this Russian project, which if realized in the form of an establishment by an Austro-Russo-Prussian Poland would convert the war from one of defence to one of conquest. As always in time of crisis Russia is liberal in promises, and we are told to expect a gift of equal citizenship for the Jews.

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THE only news of the operations of the French Army which is allowed to pass the vigilant censorship relates to a brilliant and rapid invasion of Alsace-Lorraine. It has been pushed forward over several passes along the whole line of the frontier. In the North the cavalry has reached Mörchingen, half-way between Metz and Strassburg, and the infantry has passed Dieuze. Midway the invaders are in the Donon district, close to Shirmeck, but have there met with a check at a village called Ville. In Alsace, Thann has been occupied and Mülhausen retaken. We do not know what forces are engaged in these operations, but there is reason to suppose that the Germans are not very numerous. The fighting has, however, been obstinate, and the French accounts speak of the marked superiority of their artillery, and the reluctance of the Germans to face cold steel. From this area, as from Belgium, come stories of German atrocities which show an inconceivable brutality if they are true. But it is fair to withhold judgment for the present.

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THE Austrian mobilization, ordered on August 1st, has apparently been very slow, and the concentration is not yet completed. Rumors of disaffection among Slav regiments were to be expected, and sure to be invented. There are stories of mutiny of a Serb regiment in Bosnia, and of the organization of a rising there. More circumstantial are French and Russian reports of disaffection among the Czechs, which took the form of a day's mutiny in Prague, successful for one day, in which the men shot down their German officers. A bloody suppression followed, and it is said that Czech deputies, Dr. Kramarz and Professor Masaryk, have been executed. Meanwhile, a Servian official report to the French Government describes the first heavy fighting in the Austro-Servian campaign. A battle, lasting two days, round Shabatz, is said to have ended on Tuesday in an Austrian defeat and the capture of fourteen guns and 1,600 men. Though there is little trustworthy news from this theatre of the war, the fact seems to be that Austria is moving very slowly, that Belgrade is not yet taken, and that both Serbs and Montenegrins have invaded Bosnia.

* * *

JAPAN has now definitely taken her place as a belligerent on the side of the Triple Entente. Basing herself on her treaty with Great Britain, and taking the integrity of China as her reason for action, she has delivered an ultimatum to Germany, in which she demands the evacuation of the colony of Kiao-Chau, which the "mailed fist" seized to avenge the murder of a missionary. Its garrison numbers only 5,000 men, and the German Fleet in the Far East includes no vessels of any fighting value, but the Berlin Government has none the less determined on a spirited reply. There will be

some useless carnage for the sake of the moral effect, but the resistance can hardly be serious. One by one, Japan is dealing with her European rivals, and her action is naturally highly unpopular in the United States. She speaks of the "eventual" restoration of Kiao-Chau to China, but that word is dangerously vague.

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THE first impulse of a man or woman who lives a comfortable and leisured life in a time of national emergency is to turn his or her hand to some job for which others are paid, without reflecting on the consequences. Thus, there have been many suggestions during the last fortnight that volunteers should offer their services to the farmers. We may hope that a letter from Mr. Charles Duncan, M.P., which appeared in the "Daily News" on the 14th inst., will check this mischievous tendency. The farmers are doing very well, and in many cases, if they are short of labor it is because they want labor on their own terms. There has been a farm laborers' strike in Wiltshire for some time, for objects that are pre-eminently moderate and reasonable. On the outbreak of war, the Workers' Union approached the farmers, and announced their readiness to make concessions if the farmers, on their part, would do the same. The farmers, however, have shown themselves entirely untouched by the patriotism of the nation. They replied that some of the men would be sacked, others would be taken back on a reduced wage, and that they would be required to leave the Union.

* * *

ANOTHER well-intentioned but most mistaken proposal was the idea to set women of leisure to work all over the country making clothes. One lady in her zeal wrote to the papers stating that among those who were working under her roof in this way were shop-assistants, who were giving their leisure freely for this purpose. It had not occurred to her that a vast number of shop-assistants were out of employment and destitute. Fortunately, this scheme has been checked by protests, and the Queen has invited the War Emergency Workers' Committee to appoint five representative women workers to serve on an advisory committee to suggest and organize suitable schemes for unemployed women. The first step in any emergency like this is to correct and extinguish the mistakes of philanthropy, and we may hope that this stage is now over.

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MR. BEN TILLET has made a proposal which deserves very careful consideration. He has suggested that the dockers out of work might be used to form a Citizen Guard. We think this proposal a good one. In many places special constables are being sworn in, and this, of course, is the traditional way of providing for order in times of excitement and want. But there are great drawbacks to it. Special constables all come from certain classes, and it is most important not to give the impression that the classes with property are forming a police to protect themselves from the proletariat. The true way is to organize a paid working-class gendarmerie, who will keep order and help in carrying out the work of distress committees. Nobody is going to be left to starve, and what is wanted is not a force that will protect property from the starving, but a force that will protect and serve society at large. Those who need protection most are the poor. A Citizen Guard like this would correspond rather to a fraternity of service, like the Misericordia in Florence.

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THE Government have taken steps to systematize the arrangements for dealing with unemployment and distress. No grants will be made from the National

Relief Fund (which has now reached a figure of over £1,300,000) without the concurrence of the Cabinet Committee. The Committees set up by the Government still leave much to desire in respect of the organization of working-class interests, but a few working men have been added to them. An important and necessary measure has been taken in the setting up of an Intelligence Bureau at the Local Government Board. This Bureau will be in touch with the Labor Exchanges, with the Local Government Board Inspectors, with the Boards of Guardians, and the local authorities. In this way prompt and trustworthy information will be received of the nature and extent of distress and unemployment in the different parts of the country. Mr. Seeborn Rowntree will act as Chairman of the General Committee, and Mr. Cyril Jackson of the London Committee. It is announced that all the counties but three, and out of the 240 towns with 20,000 inhabitants, all but a score, have set up their Citizen Committees. The "Daily Citizen" states that in some of the London boroughs, working men and women are not represented on these Committees.

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WE are willing to make allowances for the Government, but we do not think they are treating the Press fairly. We do not in the least mourn the eclipse of the war correspondent; he, in the main, sustains and heightens the non-combatant's interest in war. But it seems to us an unnecessarily strong measure to (a) establish an official Press Bureau, (b) set up a strict censorship, and (c) forbid the entry of British correspondents into the lines of the British Expeditionary Force. Surely (a) and (b) working together constitute an adequate protection against indiscretions, especially as the Government has all through the war been assured of the willing co-operation of the editors themselves. Cut off the newspapers from all sources of information, or confine them simply to the retailing of official scraps and the mournful task of publishing lists of dead and wounded, and you go the right way to set up depression and even panics.

* * *

No decision has yet been arrived at by the Government as to the extension of the Moratorium, which will expire on September 4th. The City is almost unanimous in favor of extension, but manufacturers are greatly divided in opinion. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is taking a sort of plebiscite of experts, the result of which will be of great value to the Cabinet in coming to a final determination. The appointment of Sir George Paish as adviser to the Treasury on financial and economic questions, has been warmly approved.

* * *

MEANWHILE, strong representations are being made to the Government as to the advisability of dealing with the immense powers which the laws of ejectment and distress give to landlords. This is a question which affects not merely the unemployed workman, who may suffer eviction or the break-up of his home, but also the small shopkeeper and the lodging-house keeper in our health resorts, in many of which the holiday population is little more than half the normal. We think that the Courts should certainly be given a discretionary power to stay ejectments, and judicial sanction should be required for the levy of distress, which is at present in the uncontrolled power of the landlord. More than this, the issue of execution should no longer be automatic, but should be a matter for judicial discretion. The constant presence of Lord Reading at the Treasury justifies the confident expectation of the public that matters of this kind will be dealt with wisely and promptly.

Politics and Affairs.

THE END OF THE ARMED PEACE.

FROM the war of 1870 sprang two great political evils, the Balance of Power and its consequence, the Armed Peace. Both were assumed to be Europe's mainstay against a fresh conflict of the nations; both led inevitably to its renewal. Germany, assuming the general guidance of Continental policy, became a nation of soldiers, and from her example sprang the general European conception of the people in arms. Among the great Powers, it remained only for Britain to complete the circle, and to this, under French pressure, a Conservative Government, with the assent of a portion of the Liberal Party, must within a brief period of its accession to power, eventually have yielded. It was essential to obtain the military combinations corresponding to and securing this political idea. First came the union of the three Empires, isolating France. It was followed by Bismarck's failure to seal the work of 1870 by the destruction of the French Republic, and his refusal to countersign Russian policy in the Near East. A new combination was inevitable. Italy, pushed forward by Bismarck's astute design of isolating France from all her natural allies, was drawn in, and the Triple Alliance was created, only to meet the counter-weight of the Franco-Russian bond. That formation again was powerless at sea, a capital defect in the age of world-commerce. It only remained to win over Britain from her historic policy of isolation. Morally, she, or her most formidable classes, had already been won. The German sea-armaments never approached her own, but they were formidable enough to arouse her jealousy and her fears. The circle of the Armed Peace was complete.

One political force stood in the way of the fast approaching war. Save in the world of ideas not yet fully born, Liberalism in Central Europe was dead, having achieved its last victory, and that an accidental one, in the overthrow of the temporal power of the Pope. Protection, the economic support of Imperialism, was almost universal. Only in Britain did the great inherent weight of the Free Trade case prevail, founding itself on a generous social policy whose corner-stone was peace. The difficulty for Britain was how, failing a new European policy, to finance armaments and social reform. The war has stopped that desperate argument, maintained in this journal since its birth. Liberalism and Socialism have been engulfed in the two great tides of armed humanity which divide the Continent. How could they resist it? The power of the peoples—nominally growing—had nowhere attained control over foreign policy. Women, the one possible party of peace left under the representative system, were excluded from it. Governments had become more and more potent, and on some sides of their activities, more humane. Among them military Germany had the ultimate power of decreeing whether the tremendous machine she wielded should slacken speed

and submit to civilized methods of direction and control. When she took the wrong decision, the White Paper revealed the fact that no effective residual power of mediation, of conciliation, remained.

Thus, Europe prepared for war on an unexampled scale, but, in no way resolved on it, plunged blindly in. In what shape will she emerge? Austria took no heed of Sir Edward Grey's reference to 1848, the year of Liberal revolt. The military Empires have all spoken and acted as if, even since the rise of Socialism, no such *revanche* were possible. But though difficult racial problems may survive the war, there must arise from the enormous mass of unmerited suffering it will involve, an organ of great remedial force. As to its general result, we have little doubt. "In war," said Napoleon, "the moral element and public opinion are half the battle." Both these forces Germany has chosen to enlist against her. Her centralized military system must fall, and in its place will arise two forces, with which what remains of Imperialism will have to count—national autonomy, already asserting itself in Ireland and Poland, and destined in all probability to win substantial victories in Denmark, in Lorraine and Alsace, and in Finland—and a new power of international opinion determined to rebuild civilized society on a basis of permanent security, and authoritatively ordered peace. This is the only possible goal of democracy, whose prime difficulty hitherto (after the great military danger) has been inequality in the standard of life subsisting in various European States. But science is no monopoly. It is a gift to all mankind, and when an exhausted, horrified Europe staggers to its feet again, it must look to science to double and quadruple its food supplies, renew its industrial machinery, and rebuild and vastly strengthen its means of inter-communication. It is to this *élan vital* that we must look to repair the stagnation of mind and purpose which militarization has imposed on a world whose inmost thought and finest effort had far outgrown it. The era of mere domination, aiming only at the subjugation of the general will, or else at its deception by means of the press, has come to an end. We must have a different, a better, a fairer world; but, above all, it must represent a common order, imposed by the Powers, small and great, in Council, and able by the advice of the best men and the best women of our time to set up a permanent seat of international justice, with just enough force and no more to make its decrees respected and to come down on offenders. The organization of The Hague was modern Europe's first half-hearted attempt to set up a centre of international jurisprudence. But it lacked authority; diplomatists and military and naval experts played with it, endeavoring to wring from it concessions favorable to their pre-arranged ideas of waging war; and, above all, it wanted the supreme human need which will arise, like the cry of a deserted and helpless child, as soon as the war comes to an end. Finally, it had no police, only national forces, looking to purely national ends. Let us hope that a general resolve of Western Europe to establish adult, not only manhood, suffrage, will provide the organ of a new, truly civilized, and at

least lightly armed society, with general self-defence as its object.

One word more. After the war we shall, we hope, have only one Power able to obstruct the reorganization of a truly civilized Europe, and that will be Russia. What she will do is, of course, a question of the first importance. We will hope that her pledge of autonomy to the Poles means something more than a bid for the disintegration of Prussian and Austrian Poland, and that her Government, not always impervious to ideals, though never long faithful to them, will take account of the fact that, if all goes as well as we dare hope, she will have to deal with a deeply changed Europe. Her people are extraordinarily sensitive to change, and no literature exists quite so sympathetic, so full of the spirit of intuitive feeling for human suffering and failure. If, therefore, we can get through without sheer anarchy, we may see a tide of true progress, under the forms and sanctity of international unity, powerful enough to carry with it the one great remaining centre of reaction. The victory of the allies—for a victory it will be—will be won essentially by the stand made by little Belgium and the supporting hand of Great Britain. Russia's immense weight will be a powerful factor, and the Slav element will be another. But even in that case, its chief moral objective will be the overthrow of a great military caste, with which (and no one can speak more feelingly on that subject than ourselves) every effort was made to come to terms consistent with European liberty. Apart from that end, no one will be thankful to any military person or system for having taken toll of hundreds of thousands of lives and set back the clock for a generation. When the end is achieved, the task of reconstruction will begin, and we shall not lightly believe that Europe will free herself of one incubus only to load her back with another.

GROWING OUR OWN FOOD.

WE hope that the attention of local authorities, citizen committees, and landowners in every district will be drawn to the hopeful and important scheme that has been adopted in Westmorland and Cumberland. In these two counties prompt action has been taken to make the fullest use of gardens, allotments, and vacant spaces by sowing seeds and planting seedlings. The scheme is in the hands of a committee, on which local authorities, landowners, and agricultural societies are represented, and the agricultural colleges are giving expert advice. The committee have published particulars of their scheme, pointing out that it is quite possible, if seedlings are planted and seeds sown now, to get autumn and spring crops of common white turnips, cabbages, early carrots, leeks, onions, kale, broccoli, lettuce, and spinach. Owners of gardens, greenhouses, and frames can thin seedlings out of their surplus stock, and owners of land that is vacant can give the use of the land for these purposes. In Westmorland and Cumberland, the landowners are giving the land rent-free for a year, and it is hardly necessary to point out that the cultivation of the land improves its prospects. If a rent is asked, the citizen committees could not do better than spend some

money in paying these rents. There are many good schemes that require a great deal of capital, but in this case the capital needed is insignificant, and success depends on labor and intelligence. The scheme has been started in rural counties, but there is no reason whatever why it should not be copied in and around our towns. There is plenty of vacant land that can be turned to good account in the neighborhood of large towns, and even within the City of London. The experiments of the Vacant Land Cultivation Society have shown that men with no agricultural or country tradition can make good use of a vacant plot when they are growing their own food on it. It is well known that in many parts of England artisans are particularly fond of allotments and gardens. The Northumberland miners, for example, who are thrown out of employment, are taking to gardening and spade culture, and the local agricultural schools are helping with advice and guidance. This kind of work makes provision for unemployed and for the partially employed. The old English workman was industrial part of his time and agricultural for the rest. The Industrial Revolution and specialization of labor have swept this dual economy away, but they have not made it impossible for workmen to cultivate a garden. Many towns have a fringe of allotments that are worked by artisans, or tradesmen, or bricklayers' laborers, or foremen in the mill; and it will make an immense difference to men in this position in the coming months if they can grow some of their own food.

The scheme has one great advantage, which is a little obscured by the habit of thinking of the problems of the war as problems that end with the war. No more fatal mistake could be made. England suffered more after Waterloo than she suffered when she was fighting with France. For war has three effects that are felt in all their severity when the world resumes the life of peace. It destroys capital, it disorganizes industry, and it reduces the consuming power of the world. During the French War we got an excessive share of the trade of the world, and the consequent readjustments that followed peace were a painful and disturbing process. The Government are now attempting, by communication with the Colonies, to secure for British industry some of the markets that German industry has lost by war, and in the circular letter on the subject Mr. Harcourt speaks of the promise of a "permanent advantage to British trade in general." No doubt some of the trade so obtained will remain in British hands, but it is idle to suppose that German industry will come to an end, and peace, no less than war, will be followed by a certain confusion and derangement of trade, with consequent unemployment. Then there is the loss of consuming power to be kept in mind. After the French War Europe was too poor to buy what she needed. After this war there will also be a great shrinking in purchasing power. From this point of view, every nation now at peace that enters into the war is multiplying the distress of the future. We have then to look forward to a great strain when the war is over, and in some respects that strain will be harder and more exacting because the stress and excitement of a national struggle produce an

exaltation of self-sacrifice and public spirit which make men and societies rise to a great situation. After war is over the inspiration is less vivid and powerful.

We have therefore to look to the future; and a widespread system of home culture is one way of building up independence for a great mass of people in the critical and anxious times ahead of us. The Government should call for reports from all parts of the country as to the measures that are being taken for bringing the waste plots into cultivation, and if there is any difficulty in the way, drastic steps should be taken. It is an emergency in which full use should be made of our agricultural experts. The supply of food is not a matter for to-day or to-morrow only. It is an urgent problem for next year. From this point of view it is deplorable that other considerations should take precedence of this pressing necessity, and we have great sympathy with the views expressed by Sir Richard Winfrey in an interview with the "Daily News." The sacrifice of the food of the nation to the pleasures of sport is nothing less than criminal. Game should be commandeered for the hospitals, and rabbits should be made public property. As Sir Richard Winfrey puts it, it is outrageous that in a crisis like this a man should go to prison—as one of his constituents has gone to prison—for knocking over a rabbit in the harvest field. The men who want to preserve foxes and rabbits for sport at such a time as this are acting like the food hogs, and they ought to receive as little sympathy.

THE FUTURE OF THE POLES.

THREE years ago public opinion in this country was deeply concerned in the fate of a Polish lady, Miss Malecka. In her long imprisonment, her secret trial, and her condemnation for a crime of opinion, we saw dramatized before us the common fate of the most generous and public-spirited of her countrymen, though, in point of fact, her status as a British protégée secured for her privileges which no native Pole would have enjoyed.

Now the Russian proclamation of autonomy, though it seems merely to follow a similar manœuvre by Germany and Austria, reveals the tragedy of the Poles in a new aspect. It has consisted not of one wrong, but of three. Their native elective kingdom was destroyed; their racial unity was broken; they were subjected by Russia and Prussia, whose intervention determined the failure of the national movement, though not by Austria, to a foreign rule which made war on their high and distinguished culture, and treated them as a helot class. If the purposes of Russia are realized, one of these three evils may end. For good or evil, the Poles will henceforth be subject to the same general control. The partition stands in history as one of the greatest of European crimes, and there is much in the idea of its undoing that appeals to the imagination. One may doubt whether the Poles would now desire, if it were possible, the restoration of an independent kingdom. Russian Poland has become at once the Lancashire and the Black Country of the Tsar's Empire, and

its economic prosperity is based on the tariff which gives to its products an advantage in Russian markets over those of Western looms and forges. Nor can we doubt that if the Poles had to choose between unity under the Kaiser and unity under the Tsar, they would prefer the latter alternative. They have experienced forcible Germanization and forcible Russification, and survived them both. But the German mill grinds smaller. It may be less brutal, more legal in its forms, and less savage to individuals, but it is also more competent and more formidable. The German looks down on the Pole as a member of an inferior race, but even the rudest Cossack is influenced by the traditional memory of the centuries when his savage ancestors rode out in wonder and greed, to sack the wealth of Polish castles and cities. Divided by religion and history from the Orthodox Slav world, the Poles are still Slavs enough to prefer the Russian connection to the German.

Our doubts about the policy of unification, if it is really in contemplation, begin when we are told that Russia means the annexation of Danzig and Königsberg. The old Hansa town and the university which gave Kant to the world are among the most venerable seats of German culture. If such a line were to be drawn by Russia, it would make in the East a problem which would repeat all the consequences of France's lost provinces in the West. When we turn to Austrian Poland, the doubt rather deepens. The Austrian Poles have no grievances of language, religion, or self-government. They have their own provincial Diet, with full Home Rule. In the Austrian Reichsrath they have a powerful national party, which is almost invariably found in the Ministerial coalition. Their nobility has its place in the ruling caste, and has given to Austria more than one Premier and countless Ministers and Ambassadors. Their proletariat would exchange manhood suffrage for a jerrymandered franchise, and would have to learn that its powerful and enlightened Socialist party had become by the transference "illegal" and powerless. Unity would mean for the Austrian Poles an almost uncompensated loss.

But the war, it will be said, must change more than the frontiers of the East. Has not the Grand Duke Nicholas promised already to the Poles freedom of language and religion, and something like "autonomy"? Such promises are a recurring feature of any national crisis in Russia. They have their interest as a criticism by the bureaucracy on its own past. It is possible that a forthcoming proclamation will promise the Jews equal citizenship. There will be more of these promises before the war is done. A German success in the Baltic might conceivably restore the constitution of Finland, and an Austrian invasion might possibly procure a pledge that the "October" reforms will at last be carried out. One "takes note," as diplomatists say, of such promises, and it will be the special duty of this country and France to see to it that they bear fruit when the war is safely over. As yet we are not sure what they mean. The Orthodox tradition has its own way of interpreting religious freedom, and freedom of language may mean only that a Pole may at last ask for a stamp or a railway ticket in his own tongue; but we doubt if it means that Polish

will be henceforth the language of the schools, the courts, and the Universities. "Autonomy" is an even vaguer term. It may mean in this instance only the grant of Zemstvos or County Councils to Poland. That is something, but it is certainly not the millennium which would induce us to throw up our hats for the re-union of Poland under the Tsars. Russian Poland has her desolating history of vanished "autonomy." The Tsar Alexander I. gave her real Home Rule. From 1815 to 1830 she had her own Constitution, her own Parliament, and even her own army, captained by the very men who had led her legions under Napoleon against Russia. It ended abruptly in 1831, partly by the folly of the Poles themselves, but chiefly because (as in the later instance of Finland) a free people within autocratic Russia made a too stimulating spectacle for the Tsar's own "true Russians."

From that year downwards, the history of Poland has been the record of alien rule by foreign officials, of the persecution of her church and of the suppression of her language, in addition to all the mischiefs of an arbitrary police from which native Russians suffer. The rising of 1863 taught the Poles that half-armed men, however brave, cannot cope with discipline and numbers. It taught them also that the nascent Russian Liberalism of that day, busied with the emancipation of the serfs and beginning to agitate for representative government, could be turned to barren reaction by the sight of a subject race which dared to raise its head. It showed them whither the new Prussian hegemony was tending. The Tsar's promise is interesting, chiefly because it shows that he appreciates the moral factor in war. He wishes at least to appear before the world as a liberator. It would have impressed us more had it been issued at the hour of victory. It will carry conviction only when it is redeemed.

The programme of this war has already broadened into cataclysmic change. We went into the war in step with the French, and they want nothing more than Alsace-Lorraine. But the Russians have already sketched a Great Poland and a Great Servia. If the Italians and the Roumanians must also be paid for their neutrality with the Trentino and Transylvania, it is obvious that Austria will have sunk from the rank of a Great Power to the magnitude of one of the larger Balkan States. The "Balance" of Europe would in that case be gone, and a lower civilization threatens in some regions of the East to replace a more advanced culture; and, finally, it is hard to see what reality of independence would remain to the Austrian-Germans, the Magyars, and the Roumanians, hemmed in between an aggrandized Russia and the Southern Slavs. We wrote last week that if a real Concert is to emerge from this war, there must be a minimum of territorial change, and the German Powers must be neither isolated nor dismembered. It is too soon to speak of precautions and settlement. But the general feeling of the nation is, we think, clear. Our part in the peace must and will be a truly liberal and assuaging part. Great Britain will not pass from a war of defence in the West to a war of conquest in the East. A campaign which may with good fortune be ended in a few weeks

must not be extended into months or years. We should make such a change for no gain at all to ourselves, and for no gain to human freedom. Our share in the war essentially and vitally ends with the liberation of French and Belgian soil, and the final repulse and discredit of the military castes which ordained those operations.

THE LIBERAL FEAR OF RUSSIA.

It is evident that there is a very considerable dread of the power and intentions of Russia in this country. It is well that the justification of this dread should be discussed now, for it is likely to affect the attitude of British and American Liberalism very profoundly, both towards the continuation of the war and towards the ultimate settlement.

It is, I believe, an exaggerated dread arising out of our extreme ignorance of Russian realities. English people imagine Russia to be more purposeful than she is, more concentrated, more inimical to Western civilization. They think of Russian policy as if it were a diabolically clever spider in a dark place. They imagine that the tremendous unification of State and national pride and ambition which has made the German Empire at last insupportable, may presently be repeated upon an altogether more gigantic scale, that Pan-Slavism will take the place of Pan-Germanism as the ruling aggression of the world.

This is a dread due, I am convinced, to fundamental misconceptions and hasty parallelisms. Russia is not only the vastest country in the world, but the laxest; she is incapable of that tremendous unification. Not for two centuries yet, if ever, will it be necessary for a reasonably united Western Europe to trouble itself, once Prussianism has been disposed of, about the risk of definite aggression from the East. I do not think it will ever have to trouble itself.

Socially and politically, Russia is an entirely unique structure. It is the fashion to talk of Russia as being "in the fourteenth century," or "in the sixteenth century." As a matter of fact, Russia, like everything else, is in the twentieth century, and it is quite impossible to find in any other age a similar social organization. In bulk, she is barbaric. Between eighty and ninety per cent. of her population is living at a level very little above the level of those agricultural Aryan races who were scattered over Europe before the beginning of written history. It is an illiterate population. It is superstitious in a primitive way, conservative and religious in a primitive way, it is incapable of protecting itself in the ordinary commerce of modern life; against the business enterprise of better educated races it has no weapon but a peasant's poor cunning. It is, indeed, a helpless, unawakened mass. Above these peasants come a few millions of fairly well educated and actively intelligent people. They are all that corresponds in any way to a Western community such as ours. Either they are officials, clerical or lay, in the great government machine that was consolidated chiefly by Peter the Great to control the souls and bodies of the peasant mass, or they are private persons more or less resentfully entangled in that machine. At the head of

this structure, with powers of interference strictly determined by his individual capacity, is that tragic figure, the Tsar. That, briefly, is the composition of Russia, and it is unlike any other State on earth. It will follow laws of its own and have a destiny of its own.

Involved with the affairs of Russia are certain less barbaric States. There is Finland, which is by comparison highly civilized, and Poland, which is not nearly so far in advance of Russia. Both these countries are perpetually uneasy under the blundering pressure of foolish attempts to "Russianize" them. In addition, in the South and East are certain provinces thick with Jews, whom Russia can neither contrive to tolerate nor assimilate, who have no comprehensible projects for the help or reorganization of the country, and who deafen all the rest of Europe with their bitter, unhelpful tale of grievances, so that it is difficult to realize how local and partial are their wrongs. There is a certain "Russian idea," containing within itself all the factors of failure, inspiring the general policy of this vast amorphous State. It found its completest expression in the works of the now defunct Pobedonostsev, and it pervades the bureaucracy. It is obscurantist, denying the common people education; it is orthodox, forbidding free thought and preferring conformity to ability; it is bureaucratic and autocratic; it is Pan-Slavic, Russianizing, and aggressive. It is this "Russian idea" that Western Liberalism dreads, and, as I want to point out, dreads unreasonably. I do not want to plead that it is not a bad thing; it is a bad thing. I want to point out that, unlike Prussianism, it is not a great danger to the world at large.

So long as this Russian idea, this Russian Toryism, dominates Russian affairs, Russia can never be really formidable either to India, to China, or to the Liberal nations of Western Europe. And whenever she abandons this Toryism and becomes modern and formidable, she will cease to be aggressive. That is my case. While Russia has the will to oppress the world she will never have the power; when she has the power she will cease to have the will. Let me state my reasons for this belief as compactly as possible, because if I am right a number of Liberal-minded people in Great Britain and America and Scandinavia, who may collectively have a very great influence upon the settlement of Europe that will follow this war, are wrong. They may want to bolster up a really dangerous and evil Austria-cum-Germany at the expense of France, Belgium, and subject Slav populations, because of their dread of this Russia which can never be at the same time evil and dangerous.

Now, first let me point out what the Boer War showed, and what this tremendous conflict in Belgium is already enforcing, that the day of the unintelligent common soldier is past; that men who are animated and individualized can, under modern conditions, fight better than men who are unintelligent and obedient. Soldiering is becoming more specialized. It is calling for the intelligent handling of weapons so elaborate and destructive that great masses of men in the field are an encumbrance rather than a power. Battles must spread out, and leading give place to individual initiative. Consequently Russia can only become

powerful enough to overcome any highly civilized European country by raising its own average of education and initiative, and this it can do only by abandoning its obscurantist methods, by *liberalizing* upon the Western European model. That is to say, it will have to teach its population to read, to multiply its schools, and increase its Universities; and that will make an entirely different Russia from this one we fear. It involves a relaxation of the grip of orthodoxy, an alteration of the intellectual outlook of officialdom, an abandonment of quasi-religious autocracy—in short, the complete abandonment of the "Russian idea" as we know it. And it means also a great development of local self-consciousness. Russia seems homogeneous now, because in the mass it is so ignorant as to be unaware of its differences; but an educated Russia means a Russia in which Ruthenian and Great Russian, Lett and Tartar will be mutually critical and aware of one another. The existing Russian idea will need to give place to an entirely more democratic, tolerant, and cosmopolitan idea of Russia as a whole, if Russia is to emerge from its barbarism and remain united. There is no cheap "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles," sentiment ready made to hand. National quality is against it. Patience under patriotism is a German weakness. Russians could no more go on singing and singing, "Russia, Russia over all," than Englishmen could go on singing "Rule, Britannia." It would bore them. The temperament of none of the Russian peoples justifies the belief that they will repeat on a larger scale even as much docility as the Germans have shown under the Prussians. No one who has seen the Russians, who has had opportunities of comparing Berlin with St. Petersburg or Moscow, or who knows anything of Russian art or Russian literature, will imagine this naturally wise, humorous, and impatient people reduplicating the self-conscious, drill-dulled, soulless culture of Germany, or the political vulgarities of Potsdam. This is a terrible world, I admit, but Prussianism is the sort of thing that does not happen twice.

Russia is substantially barbaric. Who can deny it? State-stuff rather than a State. But people in Western Europe are constantly writing of Russia and the Russians as though the qualities natural to barbarism were qualities inherent in the Russian blood. Russia massacres, sometimes even with official connivance. But Russia in all its history has no massacres so abominable as we gentle English were guilty of in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Russia, too, "Russianizes," sometimes clumsily, sometimes rather successfully. But Germany has sought to Germanize—in Bohemia and Poland, for instance, with conspicuous violence and failure. We "Anglicized" Ireland. These forcible efforts to create uniformity are natural to a phase of social and political development, from which no people on earth have yet fully emerged. And if we set ourselves now to create a reunited Poland under the Russian crown, if we bring all the great influence of the Western Powers to bear upon the side of the liberalizing forces in Finland, if we do not try to thwart and stifle Russia by closing her legitimate outlet into the Mediterranean, we shall do infinitely more for human

happiness than if we distrust her, check her, and force her back upon the barbarism from which, with a sort of blind pathetic wisdom, she seeks to emerge.

It is unfortunate for Russia that she has come into conspicuous conflict with the Jews. She has certainly treated them no worse than she has treated her own people, and she has treated them less atrociously than they were treated in England during the Middle Ages. The Jews by their particularism invite the resentment of all uncultivated humanity. Civilization and not revolt emancipates them. And while Russian reverses will throw back her civilization and intensify the sufferings of all her subject Jews, Russian success in this alliance will inevitably spell Westernization, progress, and amelioration for them. But unhappily this does not seem to be patent to many Jewish minds. They have been embittered by their wrongs, and, in the English and still more in the American press, a heavy weight of grievance against Russia finds voice, and distorts the issue of this. While we are still only in the opening phase of this struggle for life against the Prussianized German Empire, this struggle to escape from the militarism that has been slowly strangling civilization, it is a huge misfortune that this racial resentment, which, great as it is, is still a little thing beside the world issues involved, should break the united front of western civilization, and that the confidence of Russia should be threatened, as it is threatened now by doubt and disparagement in the press. We are not so sure of victory that we can estrange an ally. We have to make up our minds to see all Poland reunited under the Russian Crown, and if the Turks choose to play a foolish part, it is not for us to quarrel now about the fate of Constantinople. The allies are not to be tempted into a quarrel about Constantinople. The balance of power in the Balkans, that is to say, incessant intrigue between Austria and Russia, has arrested the civilization of South-eastern Europe for a century. Let it topple. An unchallenged Russia will be a wholesome check, and no great danger for the new greater Serbia and the new greater Roumania and the enlarged and restored Bulgaria this war renders possible.

One civilized country only does Russia really "threaten," and that country is Sweden. Sweden has a vast wealth of coal and iron within reach of Russia's hand. And I confess I watch Scandinavia with a certain terror during these days. Sweden is the only European country in which there is a pro-German militarist party, and she may be tempted—I do not know how strongly she may not have been tempted already—to drag herself and Norway into this struggle on the German side. If she does, our Government will be not a little to blame for not having given her, and induced Russia to give her, the strongest joint assurances and guarantees of her integrity for ever. But if the Scandinavian countries abstain from any participation in this present war, then I do not see what is to prevent us and France and Germany from making the most public, definite, and binding declaration of our common interest in Sweden's integrity and our common determination to preserve it.

Beyond that, I see no danger to civilization in Russia anywhere—at least, no danger so considerable as

the Kaiser-Krupp power we fight to finish. This war, even if it brings us the utmost success, will still leave Russia face to face with a united and chastened Germany. For it must be remembered that the downfall of Prussianism and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, will leave German Germany not smaller but larger than she is now. To India, decently governed and guarded, with an educational level higher than her own, and three times her gross population, Russia can only be dangerous through the grossest misgovernment on our part, and her powers of intervention in China will be restricted for many years. But all our powers of intervention in China will be restricted for many years. A breathing space for Chinese reconstruction is one of the most immediate and least equivocal blessings of this war. Unless the Chinese are unteachable—and only stupid people suppose them a stupid race—the China of 1934 will not be a China for either us or Russia to meddle with. So where in all the world is this danger from Russia?

The danger of a Krupp-cum-Kaiser dominance of the whole world, on the other hand, is immediate. Defeat, or even a partial victory for the allies, means nothing less than that.

H. G. WELLS.

THE WAR ON LAND.

THE third week of the war brings with it the news that the central route of Belgium is open to the invaders, the tidings of the inevitable fall of Brussels, and the retirement of the Belgian field army on Antwerp. Much else indeed has happened—a French dash into German Lorraine, a Servian victory over Austrians near Shabatz, the beginning of a Russian march towards Königsberg, and the entry of Japan into the coalition. But for the campaign in the West one issue is fundamental, the ability of the Germans to march on Paris within a narrow limit of time. Our estimate of the fact that Belgian resistance in the field has been broken depends mainly on whether we are thinking of the political issue, or whether our point of view is purely military. From the political aspect, it would be foolish to minimize what has happened.

But the military problem knows nothing of politics or sentiment. Frontiers, for the time being, are obliterated, and we have to deal only with a system of roads which lead to Paris. The simple material fact is now that the German Right Wing has won a clear road for its turning movement as far as Brussels, and perhaps a little further. It has spent, from the first assault on Liège, eighteen days on the task, and it has covered little more than half the distance from Aachen (Aix) to Lille. It must leave a considerable force behind it to mask the powerful forts of Antwerp. Namur, on the left of the German advance, presents a similar problem on a smaller scale. If the Belgians show enterprise as well as steadiness, the existence of these two centres from which raiding parties may issue, ought to be a continual menace to the German lines of communication. The Belgians have executed their own long pre-arranged plan, and one must suppose that it

included some destruction of tunnels and bridges which will cost the Germans long delays before the railway can be fully used. The Germans have adopted a plan of campaign which presents great advantages, but entails enormous risks. They may be able to advance through Belgium at the cost of leaving immense numbers behind them, but could they, in case of need, retreat through Belgium? The army of Antwerp would bar their route, and it could at any moment be strengthened from the sea by a French or British contingent.

The Belgians, to sum up, have delayed the German turning movement, and their army is still in being to make further anxieties for the invader. How far they proved themselves an efficient field force we do not know, and the censorship prevents any independent judgment. Day by day we have heard of small Belgian successes, which were chiefly notable for this, that on the map the names of these little victories moved steadily westward. But there has been no general action along the main defensive positions, and it is a plausible guess that they were abandoned because a German enveloping movement on the North threatened to cut King Albert's line of retreat from Louvain on Antwerp. Their duty is still to make the use of the Belgian route onerous, costly, and unprofitable.

The news is too meagre to admit of any confident opinion about the next phase of the struggle. General Brialmont, in his "Situation Militaire de la Belgique," supposed that a German invasion of Belgium would have for its chief motive the use of the route of the Meuse. The forts of Liège must have fallen by now, but Namur has hardly been assailed, and above Namur the valley is still in the possession of the French. The Meuse, if ever, cannot be used as yet. From Brussels the Germans have a choice open to them. They may elect to carry out the wide turning movement which will meet its first great obstacle at the ring-fortress of Lille. They may also move southward, through Charleroi, towards the famous "gap" of Chimay, with Maubeuge on their right as the first fortified obstacle. On that route they will certainly meet the French, well in advance of their frontier. Meanwhile we hear nothing of the movement of the other German masses. Reasoning, based on the railway system and the speculations of military writers for many a year past, taught us to expect the main German advance along the railway-line, Luxembourg—Virtou—Montmédy. Such an advance avoids the high ground and the forts of the Côtes Lorraines, and would aim at crossing the Meuse above Sedan, near Stenay. A further movement, through the Ardennes, based on Rochefort, would keep the connection on the long German front, and of this advance we have seen evidence in the attacks (so far unsuccessful) which its right has delivered on Dinant and Givet. The Germans must move at leisure in this part of the field, first, because it is difficult ground, and, secondly, because they must not strike in the centre and on their left, before their right, engaged in its great turning movement, is ready to attempt the envelopment of the French left.

We are all of us reasoning on the assumption that the German attack on France is subject to a rigid time-

limit. Four weeks are usually allowed as the interval between the completion of the mobilization and concentration of the Western adversaries and the moment at which Russia will be ready to strike. If that is an accurate forecast, the delay in Belgium may already be fatal. Reports from Russia, of course, assure us that the mobilization there has been unexpectedly rapid. But is it the case that Germany really requires to have overthrown France, in order to hold back the eventual Russian advance? We begin to doubt whether the German plans reckon so absolutely with the time factor as we and others had supposed. The German experts think very poorly of the Russian Army, and seem to be relying mainly on reserve divisions to hold the Russians back, and it is significant that they have this week called up the Landsturm. It is clear that they made the mistake of despising the Belgians. It may turn out that they have no less seriously under-valued the Russians, who are taking the offensive in East Prussia. It is much too early to venture on hasty judgments. Some faults are clear in the German system, and some grave mishaps have already befallen the German plan of campaign. But the Kaiser's troops will do what the idea of their commanders requires; they will deliver reckless mass attacks. We have yet to see the effect of these attacks on any large body of the French. There is every need for reserve and caution; but on the whole we still believe that the time factor is daily diminishing the prospects of German success. Not to succeed is for them to fail, and even to succeed too slowly is also to fail of decisive victory.

THE WAR ON SEA.

BECAUSE we have had three weeks of war and the German Fleet has not yet been so romantically foolish as to come out and be destroyed off hand, it has become the fashion to sneer at the German lack of initiative or even of courage. Our sea-dogs, we are saying, would not have sat still in their kennel like this. They simply could not have resisted such a temptation as the transportation of a large Expeditionary Force across the Channel. They would have come out, whatever the odds against them. And though their total destruction was certain, some of them at least would have broken through the cordon into the helpless flock of transports, and have wrought terrible havoc before the end came. In support of our view we point to the Russo-Japanese and Spanish-American precedents. In both cases the sending overseas of an army was hindered and delayed by the mere fear that the Port Arthur squadron would issue out, or Admiral Cervera's ships turn up in the narrow waters between Key West and Santiago. How is it that our Admiralty felt no such fear of the enemy, and that it was able to give the War Office a guarantee that the way was clear for the transference of the Expeditionary Force across the Channel to French soil? Certainly not because of any contempt for the enemy. British and German sailors knew each other too well to have any illusions. They have met continually in many ports, and fraternised. British naval officers are personally acquainted with German naval officers, and, in fact, have a high opinion of their resource and courage. We

may take it that the Admiralty's guarantee was based not upon moralising of this kind, but upon definite strategical realities. The first was the magnificent organization of our Expeditionary Force, which enabled it to be sent overseas within little more than a fortnight and without the slightest hitch. It is a military feat of the most wonderful kind. The credit of it belongs, not to Lord Kitchener, as some of the papers are saying, but to Lord Haldane, the greatest of our War Secretaries, who created the organization that did it. Had the transportation taken as many months as it has taken weeks—and with a less perfect organization it might have done—the Admiralty could not have given anything like so absolute a guarantee of safety. And, incidentally, our Army would have arrived too late for the fair. Another factor in ensuring the success of the crossing was that it was not vital to Germany to prevent our Expeditionary Force from reaching the Continent. If the Russians could have stopped the Japanese Army from crossing to Korea and Manchuria, the war would virtually have been over. So with Admiral Cervera and the American Expedition to Cuba. But our contingent will not make so much difference to the war in Europe as to have justified Admiral von Ingenobl's sending out his fleet in a forlorn hope. Another factor was purely geographical. It was an easy matter to guard the narrow waters of Dover Strait and its approaches with an overwhelming pack of destroyers and submarines, supplemented, as they no doubt were, by a French flotilla or two. From Harwich to the Hook of Holland is only 105 miles, and the Channel is but twenty miles across at the narrowest point. In these days of wireless telegraphy and scientific method of search, it would have been utterly impossible for the enemy to have penetrated through this gap into the Channel.

All naval theories are now being put to the test. It is possible that everyone of our conceptions of sea warfare is mistaken. It may be that these heterodox authorities who have held that the big ship is an obsolete weapon, are right, at all events as regards naval war in closed home waters like the North Sea. In oceanic warfare between distant nations the case for the great warship will always hold good. It is just conceivable that our battle squadrons and the German High Seas Fleet will never come into conflict during the whole war, and that it will continue to be an affair of destroyers, submarines, and mines. But it is barely conceivable. Germany has not spent all the millions on her ships for nothing. Nor would German naval men desire to remain always in shelter behind Heligoland. We must give credit to the German for his doctrines, and the doctrine of the offensive is universally held in Germany. The German Army believes in hitting, and hitting hard; the German Navy has the same belief. Sooner or later, the High Sea Fleet will come out, and dramatic events will take place in the North Sea. The opportunity is not yet. The nights are lengthening, but are still short. When the Germans come out, the period of darkness must be long enough to let them get a great distance before daylight reveals them. Summer anti-cyclones,

with their cloudless skies and crystal atmosphere, are the least favorable weather for the Germans. By day even the periscope of a submarine is visible a great distance off; by night a chance spark from a funnel would be seen some miles away. With the North Sea as smooth and as still as a lake, the beat of a screw or the crash of a hull through the water would be clearly audible five or six miles off. In a few weeks this halcyon weather will pass. Gales become more frequent every week. The period of fogs and surging seas is drawing nearer. Dark nights, misty days, and the turmoil of the seas are what the Germans are waiting for. When they come and a chance of a sudden stroke presents itself, there is little doubt that the chance will be taken, and the thunder of opposing guns will be heard in the North Sea. It should be remembered that the Germans, though their ships are capable of long-range fighting, believe in the *mêlée*, and that they practise close-in tactics in their manœuvres. Mist is the most favorable condition for bringing about a *mêlée* action. Our object is to tempt them out, but they will not yield to any temptation.

Meanwhile, we are making a rich haul of German merchant men. No doubt their great liners, converted at sea into "auxiliary cruisers," are raiding our commerce, but the balance to our advantage is enormously great, and this German raiding must soon cease. We cannot suppose that the Germans regard the loss of their mercantile marine with indifference, but they are not so unintelligent as not to have foreseen this aspect of a war with Britain, and not to have thought it out. German naval officers have never hesitated to talk frankly on the subject. They have always declared that if it came to the worst, proud as they are of the magnificent fleets and enterprise of the Norddeutscher Lloyd and the Hamburg-Amerika, they would be prepared to sell their shipping to the United States. That this thought is in the American mind too is shown in the Bill that has been rushed through Congress and has received the signature of the President, admitting foreign-built ships to American registry.

PIUS X.

WITH the death of Pius X., a memorable rather than a great pontificate comes to an end. His election was due to one of those chances of politics which, though they play a greater part in human things than we suppose, are superficial, and affect the fortunes of individuals rather than the course of affairs. The forces which made him what he was were at work under his predecessor, and are inherent in the Roman Church. The events of his pontificate were the breach with France, and the condemnation of Modernism. Both were inevitable. Pius X. was the instrument rather than the author of the policy associated with his name.

Leo XIII. spared no means to ensure the permanence of his French policy. It had been the corner-stone of his long pontificate. A diplomatist by temper and training, he knew what the French alliance had been to the Church in the past; an acute observer of a world whose underlying drift and meaning escaped him, he did not fall into the common error of underestimating

its present value. Nothing, he emphatically assured the ambassador of the Republic, should induce him to break with France: he looked forward to the one man of ability in the Sacred College, the philo-French Cardinal Rampolla, as his successor; and bestowed the purple of set purpose on nonentities on whose votes, he believed, he could rely. He underrated, as the event showed, the influence of the Triple Alliance; and, more important still, he forgot that machinery, to be effective, presupposes intelligence behind it: remove this, and a touch sets the whole out of gear. The Austrian Veto, inspired for different reasons by Germany and Italy, defeated the pre-arranged combination. An undignified scuffle followed, out of which the Patriarch of Venice, the least political of the opposition candidates, came out Pope.

His personality was more sympathetic than that of his predecessor. He was less self-centred; he was single-minded; he cared little for material things. But he was without his great gifts. He came to Rome a stranger, ignorant both of the complicated politico-ecclesiastical system which he was to administer, and of the larger world outside. He would have made an excellent parish priest or missionary bishop; for the office to which a caprice of fortune had called him he was singularly unfit. At Rome his peasant birth and his Venetian origin were against him; he distrusted the Roman Cardinals—not, perhaps, without reason; and they for the most part looked down on him. Their relations with the Vatican were formal: the Pope's inner circle was composed of Venetians and Spaniards, as ignorant as himself of the traditions and temper of Rome. At the same time nothing could be further from the truth than the notion that he was a puppet in the hands of others. He had the peasant's shrewdness; the peasant's tenacity; and not a little of the peasant's craft. No one was less disposed to play the part of the pious simpleton. He made use of instruments—and not always of worthy instruments; but his measures were his own.

To Leo XIII., a Roman of the Romans, Rome meant more than the Church; to Pius X., a pietist, the Church meant more than Rome. The former concentrated on the Temporal Power; the latter on religion, which, however, he conceived, from the Latin standpoint, not as a spiritual experience, but as a polity, a society rigidly organized into a hierarchical whole. He was essentially a man of authority; to him the whole modern movement was simply one of revolt. The opportunism of his predecessor was repugnant to him. Leo XIII. had kept his finger on the pulse of Europe, pressing here, relaxing there, according to its beating. To Pius X. this seemed weakness, and even want of faith. The Church had a definite message; and must deliver it, whether men would bear or whether they would forbear. Where he knew the facts he judged, as a rule, rightly. He miscalculated Italian political parties, but he accepted Italy; the Temporal power, he saw, was gone beyond recall. At Venice his relations with the Government and the King had been friendly; and, in spite of the opposition of the Curia, they continued friendly at Rome. His reform of the Canon Law, though its centralising tendencies are open to criticism, simplified procedure; his modification of the

incidence of festivals and of the obligation of fasting communion was a concession to the requirements of the time. He leaned to over-regulation, attempting with indifferent success the reform of women's dress and of Church music; his admission of children of seven to communion met with opposition even from the much-enduring French bishops: he overlooked the subjective side of human action, and exaggerated the efficiency of law. But it is as a politician—and, though he disclaimed the rôle, a Pope is necessarily a politician—that he will be remembered; though his policy was official rather than personal, and the spirit which it embodied that of the Church rather than his own.

It may be doubted whether the Catholics who attempt to meet modern life and thought half-way realize all that their concessions involve. It is natural that such concessions should be popular: the Church is too large and too mixed a body to stand wholly outside the time-movement; and in practice a *modus vivendi* is generally attainable. In the eyes of Catholics, as a not too discreet apologist has lately reminded us, heresy is a capital offence. But we regard this belief as a personal eccentricity, amiable or the reverse, rather than as a danger to the community. The Church has been deprived of the power, if not of the will, to inflict the death penalty, and the re-enactment of the statute *De heretico comburendo* is so remote from practical politics that the most timorous Protestant sleeps undisturbed by dreams of the Smithfield fires.

It is possible that Catholics will judge Pius X. more severely than Protestants. It is easier for the latter than for the former to see that the position is of no one man's making; that the conflict is one of irreconcilable ideas. Leo XIII. succeeded in postponing it; but Leo XIII. was an exceptional—a very exceptional—man. And postponement is not escape. His pontificate was of the nature of an interlude. When it closed, the permanent forces at work in the Church resumed their normal action; their outcome was Pius X. To recognize this is to refrain from heated comment; the law of gravitation calls neither for praise nor blame. His contribution to the net result was temperamental, and affected manner rather than matter; it is for the biographer, not the historian, to deal with it in detail.

With the personal side of the late pontificate, the official Roman world is, and has been from the first, out of sympathy. It has no leanings either to the Republic or to Modernism. But it would have made for its ends by indirect methods; it would not have carried things with a high hand. It is probable that the next Pope will be a politician, not a pietist; and in this case, had the policy of Pius X. been that of an individual, a new direction might have been given to the Church. But the Papacy is more than the Popes; they come and go, it remains. And its influence on its occupants has a continuity and a spirit unique in history. If, with the medieval mystic, we conceive a parallelism to the evangelical mysteries carried out in the lower world, may we not hear the veiled Genius of that institution address this assurance in turn to each Pontiff in the long succession: "It is not ye that speak," and "He that heareth you heareth me"?

A London Diary.

ONE hopes that the nation realizes that a stern period, trying men's hearts, is before it, and that the cautious military judgments which come from the best authorities must be taken to heart and set against the depression which so easily besets the unpractised observer of the order of campaign in France and Belgium. The best view is, I think, continually favorable. But a defensive war, fought against an army whose descent is more like that of the Cimbri and Teutones even than of the greatest of modern hosts, must contain not merely its reserves, but its seeming humiliations and losses of prestige. These must be patiently and wisely borne. The greater events of the war have in no instance gone in favor of the Germans.

THE simple Pope dies in misery, and, for so renowned a figure in the world's economy, almost in oblivion. The superficial contrast between him and his predecessor was great. But not between the later Leo XIII. and the Pius X. who never changed or could change. I saw something of the French Modernist movement in the days when its admirable leaders saw its inevitable and approaching fall. They all judged that Leo XIII.'s later encyclicals were meant to destroy them, and though the diplomatic change was great and was speedily realized when Rampolla fell, the ensuing condemnation was inevitable. Yet what a loss the last effort of Gallicanism has meant to the Church of Rome! What pure, admirable spirits conducted it—Loisy, Houtin, Laberthomière, Sangnier—how devoted to culture, how simple in living, how elevated and distinguished in morals and character! They did not all think alike; Loisy's final critical judgments carried him far. But they had democratic as well as intellectual ideals, in which was envisaged a hope of a true revival of the religious spirit and its union with the scholarship and the thought of the age. Now it is all scattered to the winds, and the pious, single-minded man who broke it up has gone too. What a quickly changing world!

I HAVE not seen mentioned in any English paper the duty originally assigned by the German press to the "Goeben" and "Breslau" in the Mediterranean. It was to prevent the French transports carrying troops from Algeria to France in the course of the war—a task, it was confidently predicted, in which the German war-vessels would have the assistance of Italy as well as Austria, while Britain looked on from a position of neutrality. This forecast was appearing in Germany on the eve of hostilities. France has since seen many thousands of her Algerian troops brought safely from shore to shore, convoyed by French and British warships, while Italy looked on not unkindly, and neither German nor Austrian flag came near. Apparently, this type of miscalculation could be multiplied without end. For instance, there seems to be no doubt that Berlin received the first news of Japan's activities with rejoicing, con-

vinced that any movements in that quarter could only be directed against the old Russian foe.

AN eleventh-hour truce over the Ulster difficulty is still possible, but the position is clearly not an easy one for a Government reluctant to resort to a *coup de main*, and at the moment the outlook is not much brighter than it was a fortnight ago. I imagine, however, that feeling on the Unionist side has been steadily hardening against the unyielding temper of the Orange group, especially since Mr. Redmond's electrifying and transforming speech. Some of the threats attributed to the Ulster extremists of what may be in store for us should the Home Rule Bill be placed on the Statute-book this month are almost too extravagant to be believed, and certainly could not be uttered in the House of Commons with impunity. Yet the open hostility of this faction might be less dangerous than the calculated inaction of its leaders in certain circumstances—say, in the event of an explosion of mob violence. There is already a good deal of unemployment in the shipyards and factories of Belfast in consequence of the war, and, in Belfast particularly, hunger and anger stalk together.

THERE is one factor of almost capital importance in the struggle, and that is the Balkan situation. Turkey has, of course, come very near a formal adhesion to the Triple Alliance. What kept her out? Probably one of the most powerful factors was the fear of the Bulgarian army. Not that Bulgaria has declared herself. She has her feelings; one can imagine what they are. And she happens to be the one deeply wronged member of the Balkan States as they emerged from the Treaty of Bucharest. Bulgarian Macedonia torn from her, her hopes of an effective entry into the Ægean thwarted, her tremendous efforts nullified, what state of mind can be hers? Is it to the interest of the *Entente* that it should subsist and rankle? I think not. The contentment of Bulgaria is not a difficult matter, and it is the only way to the re-establishment of economic and political prosperity in the Balkans by way of the now dissolved League. In that end Britain may well play a decisive part, without meeting with resistance, or even with want of sympathy, from Greece, Serbia, or Roumania. One hopes that she will not hesitate in a case where her intervention or her word might be at once powerful and really beneficent.

JUDGING by foreign newspapers, the Russian proclamation of autonomy for the Poles was not an original Russian idea at all, but merely or chiefly the sequel of a series of diplomatic efforts to quiet the Poles and to keep Polish soldiers in the ranks of their respective armies. Germany and Austria began, and then Russia came in. It is also said that Germany allowed the Polish Pretender, domiciled in Switzerland, a free passage to Cracow.

A WAYFARER.

Occasional Notes.

"In war," wrote Napoleon, "the moral is to the physical as three to one." To many of those who have not studied warfare this insistence on the moral factor may seem excessive, if not, indeed, a mere idealist aspiration. But a glance at some of the text-books on strategy will convince them of the preponderating importance which military opinion assigns to the moral element. And by this these writers mean, not only the confidence of soldiers in their own fighting capacity, and trust in their leaders, but a conviction of the justice of their cause, and the feeling that they have the whole strength of the nation behind them. An article by M. Gustave Hervé in "*La Guerre Sociale*," shows how strongly this moral tide is flowing in France. Even in the war "*pour la défense de la patrie*" in 1792, he claims, there was not the same spirit as there is to-day. Then there were La Vendée, the curés, and the Royalists. Now Royalists, Bonapartists, Nationalists, Radicals, Socialists, and Anarchists are all moved by the same feeling, and it is impossible, M. Hervé says, to realize the thoroughness of the national reconciliation in face of the enemy.

EVERYBODY is contrasting the efficiency of the French preparations to-day with the disorder of 1870. It is impossible to exaggerate the disorganization of forty-four years ago. Men living in the East of France had to cross to the West and get their arms and uniform, and then recross to the East to join their regiments. The despatches from Commanding Officers were all in the same strain. "We need everything," wrote General de Failly. "We are in want of everything," telegraphed Bazaine. And Marshal Lebœuf who, when Minister of War, had declared that everything was ready, even to the last button on the last gaiter, had to telegraph ten days afterwards that his troops could not advance because they lacked bread. But the most astounding message was General Michel's telegram, on July 21st: "Have arrived at Belfort. Cannot find my brigade; cannot find the General of the Division. What shall I do? Do not know where my regiments are." Perhaps the only parallel approaching this in history is the case of the famous Spanish explorer, Admiral Ulloa, who went to sea with sealed orders, and, after cruising for some months, returned to port, having completely forgotten to open the envelope that contained his orders.

TAINE's correspondence contains several passages that are of special interest at the moment. He was at Dresden when war was declared, and he felt at once that it was a national disaster. He wrote to his American friend, Mr. John Durand:—

"The folly of our governors is inexpressible. They are ignorant of everything; they know neither the number of the Prussian soldiers, nor the state of preparation of that immense army, nor the national passion of the Germans. To tell the truth, the latter are even prouder than the French were in 1807; they think themselves the chosen people, the superior, privileged race, and, for the past fifty years, all their professors and all their scholars have been preaching to them this ungovernable and inhuman pride. They have given it an unholy consecration, and believe themselves

called to dominate Europe—this is what they call 'Germany's historic mission'; according to them, it has been given to her because they are 'the most virtuous.' You cannot imagine how much they despise and defame French civilization."

SOME people may remember that, shortly before his death, Renan expressed regret that he must leave the world without knowing what would be the future of the young German Emperor. The Kaiser had just ascended the throne, and had given expression to the vague social aspirations of the period. Europe was in a semi-democratic mood, and Renan believed that William II.'s reign would mark a great stride in the progress of mankind.

"By order of the Prefect of Police absinthe will no longer be served." This is one of the notices posted in the Paris cafés, and though, as a French journalist remarks, in other times it would have been necessary to mobilize an army to enforce the order, it has been accepted almost without complaint. Other changes in the life of Paris are equally remarkable. The famous restaurant of the *Pré Catelan* has been turned into a home for little girls, under the management of Madame Viviani; at *Magic City* a detachment of British volunteers are drilling and preparing; one section of the Bois de Boulogne is filled with two hundred thousand head of cattle for the victualling of Paris; in another there is a camp of the Algerians and Tunisians who in normal times wander through the streets selling rugs and carpets; while, perhaps most striking of all, women are to be seen acting as conductors on the omnibuses and in the Métro. London has its share of warlike scenes, but its geographical position has saved it from many preparations that are necessary to Paris.

AMERICAN weekly journals which have reached us agree in placing responsibility for the war upon Germany. Japan's interference has, of course, affected matters, but according to the New York "*Nation*," Germany's "entrance into Luxembourg, her invasion of Belgium—both of which have had their neutralization solemnly guaranteed by the European Powers, Germany included—were the directest kind of challenge to England, and there was never any doubt as to how it would be answered. By this action Germany has shown herself ready to lift an outlaw hand against the whole of Western Europe." "History," says the "*Outlook*," "will hold the German Emperor responsible for the war in Europe." The San Francisco "*Star*" points out that the people of Great Britain did not scream for war, and regarded it as a thing not to be thought of if it could be avoided. As to the final result of the conflict, our New York namesake thinks that one thing seems plainly written in the book of the future.

"It is that, after this most awful and most wicked of all wars is over, the power of life and death over millions of men, the right to decree the ruin of industry and commerce and finance, with untold human misery stalking through the land like a plague, will be taken from three men. . . . Whatever happens, Europe—humanity—will not settle back again into a position enabling three Emperors—one of them senile, another subject to melancholia, and the third often showing signs of disturbed mental balance—to give, on their individual choice or whim, the signal for destruction and massacre."

Letters to the Editor.

THE RIGHTS OF THE WAR.

To the Editor of *THE NATION*.

SIR,—Mr. Ramsay MacDonald writes to you that "for eight years we have been weaving round ourselves, under Sir Edward Grey's management, the mesh of entanglements which has brought us to our present confusion."

May I suggest another reading of Sir Edward Grey's management—namely, that for eight years, continuing the work begun by Lord Lansdowne in the Anglo-French agreement, he has been building up and cementing the friendships, thanks to which we do not stand alone to-day, but shoulder to shoulder with others in the struggle against Germany's assertion of the supremacy of mere brute force? Mr. MacDonald cannot mean that Imperial Germany under William II. was a meek and unaggressive power until roused by the Triple Entente, or that the Triple Entente was antecedent to the first great German Naval Bill of 1900, with its open challenge to British sea-power, which is the one bulwark of our actual independence. Or should we, without the Triple Entente, have been less bound or in a better position to-day to defend Belgium against that wanton aggression for which Germany has been preparing for years past? (See on any map the network of strategic railways built solely to concentrate her invading hosts on the Belgian frontier.)

Mr. MacDonald taunts Sir Edward Grey with having remembered the Concert of Europe merely as an afterthought of the eleventh hour. But when did William II. ever stand for the Concert of Europe? Was it when he visited Abdul Hamid at a time when the "Red Sultan's" hands were dripping with the blood of his Armenian subjects? Was it when he withheld Germany's co-operation in the Cretan, and again in the Macedonian question? Or when he brought the "mailed fist" down on Kiao-chao? Or when he appeared in "shining armor" to back up Austria's violation of international treaties in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The only instance I can remember when William II. may be said to have conceived an "European" policy is one which, I am sure, would never have commended itself to Mr. MacDonald. It was when he endeavored to get this country to show the way to Europe against the United States during the Spanish-American War.

Another of Mr. MacDonald's grievances against Sir Edward Grey—perhaps the chief one—is that, having composed the main points of difference which had for years threatened the maintenance of peace between Great Britain and Russia, we can now act with her. Yet only a few years ago a *rapprochement* with Russia was one of the chief desires and objects of the Liberal Party. Not only to Mr. MacDonald but to most Englishmen, many features of the Russian autocratic system are no doubt profoundly repugnant. But why should they be more so to-day, when Russia is actually moving, however slowly, towards more Liberal institutions, and has obtained the rudiments of parliamentary representation, than they were thirty-five years ago, when Mr. Gladstone described the Autocrat of all the Russias as "the Divine Figure from the North," and despotic institutions were not held to debar the Russian Government from the enthusiastic support of English Radicals in fighting for the freedom of the Balkan Peninsula?

One word more, if you will grant me the space, on a point which lies outside Mr. MacDonald's letter—namely, the Austrian "case" against Serbia. You say that, "in the matter of plots and murders, it would be hard to libel Servians." Surely, this is a very sweeping charge against a gallant little nation that has been, I admit, singularly unfortunate in its rulers. All we know about the Austrian "case" against Serbia in this instance is that Austria refused to allow Serbia time to answer it or to refer it to The Hague; that she has produced no substantial evidence in support of it, and that it was got up at the Foreign Office in Vienna, where the same Count Forgach holds high office now who was Austrian Minister to Serbia when in the famous Friedjung trial four years ago, some of the most important "evidence" in a similar "case" against the southern Slavs, was shown, before a reluctant Austrian tribunal, to have

been based upon forgeries concocted in the Austrian Legation at Belgrade. Is that not enough to induce fair-minded Englishmen at least to suspend judgment?—Yours, &c.,

VALENTINE CHIROL.

34, Carlyle Square, S.W.
August 17th, 1914.

To the Editor of *THE NATION*.

SIR,—I agree with Mr. Bernard Shaw in his analysis of the situation; I agree with Mr. Wells in his constructive conception of the position; I agree with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in his denunciation of the difference which has been put upon the definition of an obligation of honor as distinct from an obligation by treaty; I agree with Mr. Bertrand Russell in his pinning the Liberal Government as the principal agent in the action taken by Britain; and I agree with Sir Edward Grey in his justification of the events which led up to and ended in the declaration of war by Great Britain against Germany.

This agreement with so many opposite views of so formidable a question may seem paradoxical and absurd; but it is because I think it proceeds legitimately from the facts themselves that I venture to believe an explanation from me may be of assistance in arriving at the true position.

Let us, first of all, understand that the present Government succeeded to a long-standing tradition of Government in which King and Council were, in some political issues, the determining power and not King and Parliament. Foreign policy and its outcome, war, is one of these issues. The Liberal Government had no mandate to alter this state of things, and it has been too busy dealing with domestic legislation of far greater importance to the country to think of altering it on its own initiative. Technically, therefore, it proceeded on the old lines, with the old machinery. King and Council gave the word for war.

Actually, the country has shared in this responsibility. It is true that there has been no vote in Parliament. It is true that Mr. Ponsonby, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and half-a-dozen other members have voiced objections to Parliament not definitely taking its share in the events so rapidly unfolding before its eyes. But it is also true that the country has thoroughly understood the position, has recognized—gladly recognized, I think—its moral obligation to support the policy of Liberal France against the policy of medieval Germany, and was therefore neither shocked nor surprised when the final step was taken. The difference between moral obligation and treaty obligation lies just in this fact. Sir Edward Grey denied—and properly denied—the one. He realized and felt the other, sharing it with the great mass of his countrymen.

Then we come to the actual process which sought to govern events. Every step taken by Britain was a step for peace; and surely there is nothing so remarkable in the whole range of diplomacy as Sir Edward Grey shaking himself free from all obligations, moral and actual, and declaring, in the great name of Peace, that this country would oppose any country who did not work for peace at this juncture! This was a great and courageous act. It stands to the credit of Britain for all time. It shifted the entire base of the moral obligation, and made it clear that the moral obligation was to peace, not to France or any country. It was a great-souled conception of the aims of civilization.

And it has broken down for ever the last remnants of feudalism in this country. No Minister can in the future act as if King and Council could take the place of King and Parliament. Treaties will no longer be signed; national morality will take their place.

Britain has, however, failed to secure peace; that is the great crime laid to her charge. If she had been successful, what would have been the position then? It would have been a declaration that, at last, the peace of the world was to be the policy of the world. Alas! the time has not quite come for this, and so Britain has drawn the sword. With her big Navy and her professional Army she could do no less. She had to use these materials of war to secure the future for peace. She could secure it in no other way. The only other way must have been begun ten years ago. She could have laid down her arms and placed herself at the mercy of the war lords of Europe. She could have shamed them all to touch her, unarmed, with their murder

and devastation. And ten years ago I for one was prepared to advocate such a course. I wanted my country once more to stand for a noble ideal. I wanted Britain to stand at the front of all civilization, and abolish European war by the sheer force of her great cry for peace.

It was too soon for such an ideal. The clamor was for a peace obtained by ships and guns and men, not by the moral force of the world.—Yours, &c.,

Long Crendon, Bucks.

LAURENCE GOMME.

August 16th, 1914.

To the Editor of *THE NATION*.

SIR,—No one can be more fully aware than I am of the extreme difficulty of expressing either one's feelings or one's opinions in such a way as to be helpful in this overwhelming national crisis; and I know there are many who are in the same predicament as myself. The actual progress of the war is all that seems to signify for the moment, and, as a soldier's grandson, a soldier's son, and a soldier's brother, I find myself carried away by the military appeal and the sacrifice and heroism of battle stir me with the deepest emotions, and even make me restless with the desire to take an active part in the defence of my country. I only make this personal reference in order to show that I am not an uncompromising "peace-at-any-price," "stop-the-war" advocate, but am as jealous of my country's honor as anyone that could be found. Nothing matters while our national safety is threatened, and I ask myself: Will anyone pause to consider arguments while they are eager for reports of engagements, or news of relations at the front? Would it not, then, be better to be silent, and so tacitly express approval of the past policy of the Government, and applaud the self-laudatory articles with which the press is filled? It would certainly be very much easier, and I wish to goodness I could do it. But principles I believe in cannot be dispelled at will, and do not allow me any peace of mind. Inconvenient questions keep on presenting themselves to me and waiting for an answer. I wonder, for instance, if Liberals were in Opposition, whether only a negligible band would be finding their feeble protest ineffectual, or whether there would not have been a formidable and eloquent denunciation of the policy which has led us into the position in which we now find ourselves. I wonder, in that case, too, whether the tone of certain organs of the press would have been exactly what it is!

But it is not to recriminate or protest that I write. While I hold no brief for German militarism or German diplomacy, I find already the most fantastic opinions are held, not only as to the policy which led to the war, but as to the ultimate objects we are supposed to be striving for in this world-struggle. If we, who believe that very grave mistakes have been made, continue to remain silent, and if, as we are told, this war may be of very long duration, those mistakes will never be stated, and the hope of correcting them in future will vanish.

I am not going to embark on a long-reasoned argument which could not be compressed into the limits of a letter. I will simply ask some questions, and answer them with a single monosyllable.

Have the Government, during the past six years, joined in the insane competition in armaments, and led the way in matters of expenditure?—Yes.

Have they at any time made any definite concerted attempt to bring the Powers together to prevent the continuance of this competition which many prominent statesmen have deplored?—No.

Have they persistently advocated, supported, and encouraged the policy of the Balance of Power, which divided Europe into two hostile camps, producing high tension and possible outbreak of war at every diplomatic dispute that arose?—Yes.

Has this policy proved itself a complete and tragic failure, since this division of Europe, with all the negotiations which have gone to support it, is the main underlying cause of the war?—Yes.

So far from the correspondence in the White Paper being the cause of the war, does it not clearly show that our previous policy had committed us, and we were simply entangled in meshes of our own creation?—Yes.

Is it right or even advisable to make binding engagements with other nations behind the backs of the people in secret?—No.

Did the Government declare in the most explicit way that we were free and unfettered in the event of war, when all the time British and French naval experts were drawing up plans for mutual defence and assistance?—Yes.

Should we have declared war on France if she had found it incumbent on her for the sake of national safety to send her army across the Belgian frontier?—No.

Did Germany know from the first that we were bound to support France, and did she want to fight us?—No.

Would it not have made a considerable difference to the attitude of Germany if we had been quite open in our intentions from the beginning?—Yes.

Did the Prime Minister, in referring to what he called "the infamous proposal," at the same time draw attention to the German Ambassador's conciliatory request at a later date that we should "formulate the conditions on which we would remain neutral"?—No.

Is not Germany's chief fear, which has been enormously increased of late, a Slav inroad from Russia?—Yes.

Does our support of Russia mean the strengthening of Russian autocracy and Russian militarism, and the consequent check of the development and enlightenment of the Russian people?—Yes.

Will Russian success mean the further acquisition of territory by Russia in Europe, and is not this very undesirable?—Yes.

Is there a vestige of foundation, in view of the hopeless strategic position in which Germany now finds herself, for the idea that this is all the outcome of a German plot against this country?—No.

Is it possible or desirable that the German Empire should be shattered and her natural expansion forever prevented?—No.

Is the capture of all German colonies likely to make a passive and submissive Germany in the future?—No.

Was there before the outbreak of the war any animosity among the British people against the Germans?—No.

Is there reason to suspect that in the official world an Anti-German policy has been steadily pursued for some time past?—Yes.

Is it not deplorable that when Great Britain is plunged into the most devastating war the world has ever seen, we should none of us know clearly what we are fighting for?—Yes.

Are the peoples of Europe going to be massacred in hundreds of thousands and are incalculable numbers of non-combatants going to be reduced to misery and ruin only because a few ministers, diplomats, and monarchs have quarrelled?—Yes.

Are the victorious going to gain anything either materially or morally by this war?—No.

All this means that a new European system and a new method of diplomacy will have to be created out of the chaos, and means will have to be found to prevent a return to the fatal competition in armaments. Those who consider that we are spotless and all the blame is on the other side will not be of much help in the stupendous task that lies before us. Whether out of the broken fragments of Liberalism some new force can be constructed to secure fair terms for a lasting peace and to cope with the colossal problems of the future, it is too early to say. Some I am glad to think have sufficient imagination and a long enough vision to begin now at once to look into the future.

Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Russell both show by their letters in your last issue that it is by the realization of the fatal errors of the past that the problems of the future can best be faced. I have felt compelled to write because if there is anyone bold enough to speak out even now, I am ready to join him.—Yours, &c.,

ARTHUR PONSONBY.

Higham Court, Gloucester.

August 18th, 1914.

To the Editor of *THE NATION*.

SIR,—I have read with interest the letters of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Bertrand Russell in your issue of August 15th. From the opinions of these two gentlemen I should never differ without much misgiving, but I confess that after

reading these two letters, I not only fail to follow their arguments but I am entirely at a loss to know what they are aiming at. Both of them are overwhelmed by the horror of this great conflict, by the suspension of social progress, and by the stark barbarism of such an arbitrament. To this extent, I suppose, most of us agree with them—at any rate, I most unreservedly do so. The cardinal error in both cases lies, I think, in a failure to face realities. When Mr. MacDonald accuses Sir E. Grey of “leading this nation into war” and of “laboring patiently for eight years and making war in Europe inevitable, while pursuing what he thought to be the path of peace,” what precisely does he mean? I gather from another sentence in his letter that he thinks that Sir E. Grey should, eight years ago, have worked for a Concert of Europe. But any candid student of the relations between the Governments of the European States must agree with the view, indicated by Sir E. Grey in the letter which Mr. MacDonald somewhat inaccurately summarizes, that such a proposal in the past would have had no conceivable chance of success, and that it was only possible as a suggestion in the “relief and reaction” following the escape from a European conflagration. A statesman may see the ideal; but he would merely waste his energies and undermine his influence for good if he tried to enforce on foreign Governments schemes which they regarded, however mistakenly, not merely as Utopian, but as entirely subversive of their “biological necessities.”

If this is not what Mr. MacDonald means, then I can only conclude that he thinks that, in some unexplained way, Sir E. Grey is responsible for the fact that France and Russia and, I suppose, Belgium, are now at war with Germany and Austria. To everyone who realizes the ambitions of Russia on the one hand, and of Austria and Germany on the other hand, it must be manifest that, given the conduct of Austria and Germany in relation to Serbia, and their refusal to recognize that any other Power had any right to intervene, war was inevitable.

Mr. Russell, in his eloquent letter, is, if he will allow me to say so, still more chary of justice to the Foreign Secretary and still remoter from reality. He starts with a picture of Europe as a “peaceful comity of nations a month ago,” though the succeeding paragraphs of his letter show that it was a “peaceful comity” which was armed to the teeth and saturated with “hatred” and “fear.” In a very rhetorical passage he declares that this war has been brought about because a set “of official gentlemen”—I omit Mr. Russell’s description of them, as it cannot assist his argument, and probably, when the flame of his indignation subsides, he will regret the expressions which he has used—“chose that it should occur, rather than that any one of them should suffer some infinitesimal rebuff to his country’s pride.” The diplomatists (he says) “drifted from hour to hour, restrained by punctilio from making or accepting the small concessions that might have saved the world.” I have not the remotest notion on what passages in the White Paper this is based, nor have I any clear idea to what Mr. Russell refers. Here, again, if I may venture a surmise, he seems to be looking at the surface of things and avoiding the realities. Surely the reality is that Austria, careless of the peace of Europe, insisted on chastising Serbia; that Germany, inconsiderately or deliberately, supported her, and that Russia found or felt herself unable to stand by unmoved. If the refusal of Germany and Austria to recognize that the question was one of European interest is Mr. Russell’s “punctilio,” I understand what he means; but, in that case, he might have avoided what appears to be an attack on all the diplomatists of all the countries concerned.

But, suppose that the attack on Serbia was a deliberate and calculated provocation to European war, what then becomes of this glowing paragraph about the “punctilio” of diplomatists? Finally, Mr. Russell quotes Sir E. Grey’s letter of August 1st (No. 123) as showing that “the neutrality of Belgium, the integrity of France and her colonies, and the naval defence of the Northern and Western coasts of France were all mere pretexts, and that if Germany had agreed to our demands in all these respects, we should still not have promised neutrality.” As is pointed out in other parts of your issue, this does scant justice to Sir E. Grey; but, after all, it is merely verbal. Germany had delivered her ultimatum to Russia, war between those countries was

inevitable, and France would therefore, necessarily, be involved as the ally of Russia. Can anyone, for a moment, suppose that, in these circumstances, Germany, whose whole plan of campaign depended on the violation of Belgian neutrality, would or could contemplate the purchase of our neutrality by changing the whole of her scheme of mobilization in order to respect the neutrality of Belgium? The disorganization would be so colossal and so disastrous to Germany that it was impossible that the suggestion (for it was nothing more) which Sir E. Grey reports, should be serious or anything but a clumsy attempt to hoodwink the Foreign Secretary, who would not have been the man that we know him to be if he had not at once perceived that there was no substance or reality in the suggestion of the German Ambassador.

Let us, sir, not waste time in vain regrets that the smouldering animosities of Europe have, for the time, destroyed the path of peace, but let us hope and strive that ultimately from this welter of crude barbarism Europe may emerge saner, more peaceful, and with a surer perception of the fundamental interests and obligations of humanity, and let us in the meantime try to keep our minds fixed on the realities of the position and endeavor to be fair, even to the leaders of our own nation.—Yours, &c.,

A. F. PETERSON.

Lincoln’s Inn, W.C.

August 17th, 1914.

To the Editor of THE NATION.

SIR,—The present seems to me a most inappropriate moment for discussing the causes of the war, as you do in your current issue. We are in the war, and we must win it. On the other hand, when you express a view of those causes which seems to me to be radically false, it is hard to remain silent. Nothing could be more dangerous than that, when the time comes for a settlement, we should approach that settlement with a distorted conception of the facts. I do not want to continue the controversy by arguing the other side; but neither do I want what I consider the true view of the matter to go by default. The best course seems to be simply to place on record the fact that there are many of us who hold an altogether different view from yours. We think that, while the roots of the conflict lie in the mistaken foreign policy of the past eight years, yet the main immediate cause, so far as the European War is concerned, was Russia’s interference in the Austro-Servian quarrel. We think that a Minister, who, having in the Russian *Entente* a powerful lever with which to prevent that interference, nevertheless failed to use his opportunity, is not entitled to the praise which you bestow upon him.—Yours, &c.,

CHARLES RODEN BUXTON.

7, Kennington Terrace, S.E.

August 18th, 1914.

[We must reply to Mr. Buxton, as to all our correspondents, that while we hold fully to our continuous efforts to keep Britain and Germany at peace, we also think that the events of the last few weeks destroyed those endeavors and hopes, and created a situation in which, after the Belgian invasion, the only alternatives were an immediate intervention, with the probable effect of shortening the war and enabling Britain to throw her weight into the scales of a merciful and just peace, and a late intervention, as the result of which both those aims must have been greatly weakened, if not entirely nullified. After all, the Government did little more than re-adopt Gladstone’s position in regard to Belgium. And in itself that position, without further developments, must have involved intervention.—Ed., NATION.]

To the Editor of THE NATION.

SIR,—May a contributor to THE NATION, with a standing of four or five years’ letters and articles on behalf of an Anglo-German *rapprochement*, be allowed an answer to your leader of August 15th? That article is entitled, “Why Britain is Right”; but its contents would be better described by the heading “Why Sir Edward Grey is Right,” since the British “public opinion,” which he held over the head of the German Ambassador (White Book, p. 66, No. 123) was signally absent in the Liberal papers, amongst others THE NATION of August 1st, which remained pacifically

expectant until after Sir Edward Grey's own speech of the 3rd.

Be this as it may, your article's title has put the question as one of *ought*, not one of *could*. Now, sir, your two or three years of unflinching criticism of our Foreign Office's policy with regard to France and Russia has indeed made it intelligible to your readers why Great Britain *could* not keep out of this war, since it has shown the steps, the various "commitments," the various obligations, the whole ambiguity of the *entente* policy which inevitably brought Europe to the brink of a possible war, particularly as the vast majority of English Liberals turned an utterly indifferent ear to your exhortations, and to those which Mr. Brailsford has admirably summed up in his recent "War of Steel and Gold," exhortations not to continue this dumb-driven attitude towards a policy which Liberalism had taken over from its Tory predecessors. What we have read in THE NATION has allowed your readers to understand perfectly, on account of what long series of routine blunders and antiquated formulae, England, undefended at this miserable moment by Liberal opposition, which made itself heard against our South African policy, *could* not keep out of this war. It *could* not because of its Foreign Office tradition and routine, because of its party government and "party loyalty," because of all that is out of date in its political habits, of all that is unintelligent and apathetic in its political life. That England *could* not, if such a crisis presented itself, keep out of such a war must have been almost a foregone conclusion to intelligent readers of THE NATION: that you had made quite clear to us in all the articles touching on these subjects you published *ante bellum*. *Could* not keep out of the war. In your present issue you turn over a new—and, to some of your readers, an unexpected—leaf by undertaking to demonstrate why England *should* not have kept out of this war; and why the policy which you have hitherto been denouncing, and the Minister against whom you have been warning us, together brought about the astonishing result that England, which had been *wrong* about Persia, *wrong* about France, was suddenly *right* against Germany. The demonstration of this quasi-miracle (and patriotism, we all know, can work many miracles!) may, I think, not satisfy every one of the readers whom you have hitherto educated to independent Liberalism; and, as I have not only read Sir Edward Grey's White Book, but also shared with you the rarer advantage of reading the translation of the first instalment of its German equivalent, which, in the light of my previous knowledge of Germany, I cannot dismiss as summarily as you do, I venture to speak on behalf of a certain number of readers of your article, and to criticize it on one or two points. I will take these points as they come, because they are not logically connected, and do not therefore require treating in any logical order.

First, you attribute to Sir Edward Grey two "marked successes" of which, "merely on grounds of prudence, Germany should have taken full account." "*He secured the virtual co-operation of Italy.*" Now, sir, no one knowing Italy, knowing that she is still engaged in a difficult, and now most unpopular, war in North Africa, that the anti-Austrian feeling is intense and unhidden, and, finally, that not two months ago the country—from one end to another—was held up for forty-eight hours by an admirably organized general strike, in the course of which a band of peasants deprived a general and his staff of their swords, and locked them up in a wayside café—no one intimate with Italy's present condition can really accept what she calls "neutrality" and you call "virtual co-operation" as a marked success attributable to Sir Edward Grey.

Secondly, "Sir Edward Grey's language was that of a mediator, not of an ally of France." It does appear from the despatch No. 119 that Sir Edward Grey, in answer to France's question "whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her," declined to "undertake any definite engagement," "at the present moment" (July 31st). But he admits that he had, the same morning, said to the German Ambassador "that if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it," a statement of which we get the explanation in the passage of his speech of August 3rd, referring to France's previous withdrawal of the fleet hitherto protecting her northern and western coasts in

order to replace one of our own in the Mediterranean, and England's consequent moral obligation to defend the portion of France thus left unprotected for our benefit. "My own feeling is this—that if a foreign fleet engaged in war which France had not sought, came down the English Channel, and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand by."

Thirdly, in order to prove that Sir Edward Grey "endeavored to put himself 'outside the diplomatic mood,'" you point out "how far he went may be judged by his hint to the Austrian Ambassador that a European War might well be followed by the popular risings of 1848." Did the imagination of this "usually reserved and somewhat unimaginative man" suggest that the Labor Party might become unruly and proclaim a general strike in case of English defeats? Or perhaps that France might once more find war complicated by a Commune? No, sir; Sir Edward Grey's "hint" was less imaginative and more diplomatic. The "Risings of 1848" were to be Austrian and German risings; for, although you say "such a suggestion applied equally to Romanoffs, to Hohenzollerns, and to Hapsburgs," the fact that this is a Pan Slavist, a Greek Orthodox, war, surely reduces the "Romanoff" to a mere piece of verbal symmetry, and shows that Sir Edward Grey's alarming forecasts were a mere reminder that Hapsburg and Hohenzollern might have to deal with revolutions as well as with war. I cannot therefore accept this as a proof of Sir Edward Grey's sudden patriotic transformation from the man who partitioned Persia into an appreciator of "the desperately serious human factors of the situation."

Fourthly, "Virtually she (Germany) said to us: 'If we win, we will allow France to remain a materially intact European Power (her moral independence must, of course, have disappeared). . . .'" Now, whence do you get this of course with which you parenthesize the German proposal? Why should a German victory in 1914 deprive France of the "moral independence" which the victories *plus* loss of provinces in 1871 did not in the least deprive her of? Independence? In what sense? One can only remember a famous sentence about the danger of "France being drawn into a certain nation's orbit," a sentence which was spoken by a member of the present Government a few years ago, and which THE NATION did not applaud. This idea of yours recurs in different words: "The second and final humiliation of France and her withdrawal from the circle of great Powers"—to which I would answer that, as France did not so withdraw in 1871, the "circle of Great Powers" from which a new German Victory would have possibly withdrawn her must be the *inner* circle of Great Powers representing England's and Russia's side of the famous balance you are denouncing even now while excusing a war, a "diplomats' war," brought about by the famous division of Europe into rival camps, against which THE NATION has so long warned us.

Fifthly, "The equivalent for which Sir Edward Grey asked in this interview was whether Germany would give the same assurance with regard to Belgian neutrality as had been given by France." But France could instantly get into Germany (and has), protected by her own line of fortresses, so she could naturally dispense with violating anyone's neutrality, whereas the fact that those same French fortresses represented a delay sufficient to bring Russia on to Germany's back is surely shown, not only by the map but by the very circumstance that, rather than forego the passage through Belgium, Germany has drawn England upon her. To expect from Germany an equivalent to France's declaration is calling for fair play between a man armed with a stick, and threatened by one man (or, rather, two men!), and a man armed with a long-range rifle.

Finally, in your last sentence, you speak of a "war of diplomats, not of peoples." Is not that the severest condemnation of any war, and have you not taught us to regard Sir Edward Grey as the type of the diplomats in question?

Moreover, when you go on to say that "the very word *revanche* should be buried in an almost passionless war," are you not speaking for a victorious France, not for a vanquished Germany, and leaving out of count the *revanche*—the Leipsic after Jena—which Germany in its turn may invoke, and invoking throw itself once more into the arms of that Prussian militarism whose preponderance you so gravely deprecate?

Some of your readers will doubtless say that this is not the moment for seeking responsibilities. It is perhaps not. But I think I am expressing the opinion of an important minority of your readers in pointing out that the article I am dealing with precisely attempts to fasten the sole responsibility for this war upon our adversary. And such laying of responsibility on Germany, such treating her as the spiritless and immoral instrument of a mere brutal militarist caste, is a thing which all our German Liberal friends, those with whom we were working towards a better understanding, working for the abolition of capture by sea, for a diminution of the "war trades," for everything which, in their eyes, meant a gradual cessation of a Prussian military régime, will feel as a deep injustice and injury, and, alas! treasure up, even in the hour when we and they ought to be joining forces against militarism, war-trading, and diplomatism, not in their country only but in ours.—Yours, &c.,

VERNON LEE.

August 16th, 1914.

To the Editor of THE NATION.

SIR,—I should like, with your permission, to place on record what I believe to be the feeling of a large body of pacifists at this juncture.

We have protested against the violence of some of the utterances of members of the Government as tending to promote a needlessly bitter feeling between England and Germany. We have protested against the mad rivalry in armaments, both by land and sea, and against the various encouragements to the desire for war. We have protested against Sir E. Grey's alliance with Russia, and his strangely misleading statements about the absence of any military alliance with France.

But the situation is suddenly changed by the German invasion of Belgium. We have always pleaded for international law as the great security for peace, and here is a flagrant violation of international law. We have always pleaded for the rights of the small States, and here is a small State, in which we have a special interest, invaded by the most powerful military Power in Europe. We have never denied the duty of England to fulfil clear and solemn obligations; and here is a clear obligation which she cannot honorably evade.

For the moment, therefore, we must forget the former offences of the Government and defend Belgian independence. But, surely, we should see to it that that is our one object. It may be that we shall incidentally break the tyranny of the Prussian Junkerthum. But we have no desire to see that tyranny replaced by the rule of the Russian Black Hundred. The victories of France in Alsace are a just retribution for the horrors of Zabern. But many of us feel that an independent Alsace-Lorraine would be a better security for European peace than the restoration of those provinces to France. In one word, as soon as Prussia is driven from Belgium and compelled to accept that defeat, we ought to insist on such a settlement as will secure liberty and peace to Europe without aggrandizing the victors or unduly humiliating the conquered.—Yours, &c.,

C. E. MAURICE.

August, 15th, 1914.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have read the article in THE NATION of the 15th. Several expressions are the same as those which I have used; but as I think that my remarks represent a special section of opinion, distinct alike from thorough-going support of the Government on the one side, and absolute non-resistance on the other, it may be worth your while to print my letter.

To the Editor of THE NATION.

SIR,—Do not the queries which I venture to submit to you call for consideration by every sane man in the country? It is always well to know where you are, and to be ready for what is to come.

Whether Austria was not justified in believing that Serbia was the agent provocateur of a great Slav movement for the destruction of the Monarchy, instigated by Russia?

Whether, if that was so, the Austrian Government could have done otherwise than it did?

Whether Germany had any choice but to give Austria support?

Whether, since France had made herself a satellite of Russia, Germany was not bound to attack her?

Whether the neutrality of Belgium, which was a device for keeping the country out of the hands of France, had not become, in fact, hostile to Germany?

Whether, this being so, the action of Germany in disregarding a neutrality which had become a sham, was not identical in kind with the seizure of the Danish Fleet by Great Britain in 1807—a measure much applauded by patriots?

Whether England, by undertaking to protect the coasts of France, did not, in fact, commit herself to declare war on Germany?

If, in 1803, the Spanish Government had declared that it wished to remain neutral between France and Great Britain, but would not allow a British Fleet to enter the Mediterranean for the purpose of blockading Toulon, what answer would the British Government have made?

Whether the whole conduct of the British Government at this crisis does not demonstrate the deliberate falsity of the assurance given to Parliament that no binding engagement had been entered into to support Russia and France in any war with Germany?

Whether the Tsar's promise to the Poles is not a revelation of just such a plan as Austria believes was formed, to advance the power of Russia enormously in Central Europe under cover of a Finnish self-government for Poland?

Whether his own subjects would not take the Asiatic remedy of a former Tsar, and give Poland the self-government of Hungary?

Whether, if the scheme succeeds, Russia will not also dominate South-Eastern Europe, and have Asia Minor at her mercy?

Whether the loss of life and increase of burdens which this war must entail on France will not strengthen the causes which tend to diminish her population?

Whether, when Austria is broken to pieces, Germany crushed, and France impoverished, Great Britain will not be forced to see that her only course, if she wishes to be in a position to put a check on Russia, is to form a universal compulsory service Army on the common model, plus the Navy she already maintains?—Yours, &c.,

DAVID HANNAY.

13, Orchard House, County Grove, S.E.

August 20th, 1914.

We have been asked to publish the following communication from a Frenchwoman:—

August 7th, 1914.

And now! We are in such anguish for the last week.

I do not know if you can form an idea of what this abominable war is for us. All the nation is in arms. Not one family who has not a father, husband, son, or brother in the army. With us C—, A—, my brother A—, my brother-in-law H—. A family of friends of ours has twenty members who are going off; another four sons, another three, all young (who have voluntarily enlisted). In a word, all our able-bodied men from twenty to forty-seven or forty-nine are going. (The greater number started on the second or third day of mobilization; the others follow on the seventh, tenth, or seventeenth day.) A great number of voluntary enlistments take place every day; young people of eighteen, and older people up to fifty—many writers (for instance) who had passed the age, Maurice Barrès, Pierre Loti, &c.

So the life of the country is entirely disorganized. From the day after the mobilization there was not a single omnibus in Paris, all their conductors having become soldiers, and the vehicles themselves transformed into ambulances for the wounded, and sent from day to day to the frontiers, &c. The motors, carriages, and horses of private persons are requisitioned (for the most part) to be sent to the war. So that almost all commerce has stopped. The greater part of the shops, as much in Paris as at N— and throughout France, are shut, and the factories closed. It is difficult enough to obtain food; at some shops, which

only open for some hours in the day, you have to stand in a queue, and with necessary food (milk, meat, &c.) you are put on rations. For three days there has been no butter in N—. But, thanks to the general goodwill, all is made easy, and will be arranged, I think.

In fact, I could not say too much of the admirable spectacle of the union of all in face of this calamity, which spares no one. The public emotion is the strongest I have ever experienced. And one's heart is divided between admiration for this population, which accepts with calm and dignity the most terrible sacrifice (not with boastful enthusiasm, with which we have too often to be reproached, no drunkards drinking to give themselves courage), whole files of soldiers starting without a tear, resolved to sell dear their lives; and admiration, at the same time, for the extraordinary order with which this mobilization, so much feared, is accomplished. (The trains carrying the soldiers start from certain stations, day and night, at intervals of two minutes, at other stations at intervals of four minutes, and there has been no accident as yet, and all arriving sure to time.) And at the same time one feels horror at all these preparations for this atrocious butchery, a more formidable one than the world has ever seen. It is so abominable that one cannot even conceive of it clearly. . . . It is the maddest monstrosity that could be imagined. And to think that it is a little handful of men—the German War Party—who are forcing all these unhappy populations to cut one another's throats, that seems an insanity incompatible with our civilization. Ah! if this could be the last war! That is what one is reduced to wish.

And the indignation is such in France against the German lies, becoming every day more monstrous, against those Germans who have penetrated France even before any declaration of war (while their Ambassador was still in Paris), who have forced us to rise as one man to defend our invaded country, and to submit to the horrors of a war which we sought to evade, so that if their bad cause betrays them and they are not the stronger, as they imagine, I fear our soldiers will be terrible in their anger if they are able to penetrate on to German soil. The officers will have as much as they can do to stop them from acts of violence unworthy of them.

I should wish also to be able to tell you of the enthusiasm for the help the English are bringing us, since we are sure without them we should be much more anxious; we should fight just the same, but they give us confidence.

Never before these days would one have believed in the fraternal union of all the parties who are so strongly divided in France. The unique sitting of the Chamber on August 4th, the anniversary of the grandest date of the Revolution of 1789, made the most reassuring impression that one could have hoped for. The worst enemies joined hands, all showing confidence in the Government that they attacked some weeks before, all voting as one man the measures demanded of them. And, since then, many of the deputies, who are exempted, as such, from service, have gone to enlist voluntarily for *la Patrie en danger*. How many like things recall the Revolution!

We have the impression that the English Government has done what it could to obtain peace, and that it has not been able to obtain it. . . . If it had been strong enough to declare from the beginning that England would march against Germany with resolution, W— has the idea that Germany would not have dared to advance as she has done, and that all these atrocious wars would have been avoided. But he feels, also, that if the English Government had so expressed itself, the country would not have followed it; the war was too unpopular, and the Government would have fallen. . . . But, without doubt, Germany counted on the neutrality of England, and thought to crush us as well as Belgium. But there will be great difficulties for the harvest. If you know round you any volunteers who would come and do agricultural work in France they will be welcomed with open arms, and could help in many ways. They are going to try to employ women and children in all kinds of work. At Paris already they are putting women on the Métro, on the tramways, &c. In the same way, if you know any doctors—either men or women—as the greater part of ours are with the army now; the populations are very short of them, and those who are left are worked to death.

. . . We have lived in a fever during these days. It seems a fortnight since the mobilization and it was only known on Saturday the 4th. I was in Paris in a workman's quarter and it was very impressive to see the men and women reading the simple little notices which called every man under the flag. Without a gesture, without a cry each one went home to make preparations. It is all so sudden. A few days before we were so far from expecting a war!

Have you read what fine speeches were delivered at the burial of Jaurès (assassinated by a man nearly mad). And the one that made the most impression was one by a working man (not holding exactly the same opinions as Jaurès). All parties were united in doing honor to the memory of this great Socialist. Maurice Barrès, himself a reactionary, spoke with enthusiasm of the speech of an anarchist workman. I am copying you some words of his speech. "Jaurès was our support in our passionate effort for peace. It is not his fault, nor ours that peace has not triumphed. . . . Before going to the great massacre, in the name of the workers who are gone, in the name of those who are going, of which I am one,* I cry aloud before this coffin all our hatred of the savage imperialism which has worked up this horrible crime. . . .

"Jaurès held himself before us like a torch that no one . . . could put out. And I proclaimed aloud . . . our faith in the Internationale, our resolution to conquer in a great struggle all liberties and to give them to others."

These words were cast forth with a bitter and striking accent—the emotion is impossible to describe. . . .

Poetry.

HARVEST, A.D. 1914.

BY THE WAYSIDE.

I.

O'ER harvest hills soft haze of shimmering heat
Folds blue and dim; glows fiery sheen of wheat
At core of amber sunbeams; kindled white,
The road creeps in beneath green shadow plight
Of woven branches. Here two gossips greet,
"Good morning, ma'am; sure 'tis the grand hot day."
"Aye, aye, too hot for our poor lads away
Off yonder in the battles, where they fight."
"Ah, cold enough, God knows before this night
'Tis many a one will sleep."

Such talk have they
Along the footpath flecked with leaves and light.

II.

The road glares like a white-hot ploughshare thrust
Athwart the plain, whereon a rider lone
Three times the blaze of noontide fierce hath known,
Mocked with the parching air, the choking dust,
For all his daily fare; still, grown half-blind,
Goes stumbling, starved, and goads his starving horse
With ruthless steel, that rage may bring remorse
The more to sadden his sick heart. Yet shined
This summer day that ripens the red-gold corn
In rustling fields, on none whose lot forlorn
Draws nigh through heavier hours a desolate end;
Since comes in foemen's guise his one grim friend,
Nor holds his cruel doom a kinder fate
Than if, ere close the sunset's fire-silled gate,
Some long-flamed shaft a curven blade shall bend,
And thither reach, that, reaped as harvest fruit,
Be to the great Dark gathered man and brute.

JANE BARLOW.

* All these Socialists were anti-militarist before the war. But in face of this traitorous aggression and the invasion of the territory, they have all united against the enemy and have gone to the war.

Reviews.

THE MIGRATION OF WEALTH.

"The Export of Capital." By C. K. HOBSON. (Constable. 10s. 6d. net.)

THE expert economists have been singularly slow in taking up the study of the export of capital, and politicians are hardly aware as yet that it presents a problem. Valuable statistical studies are indeed to be found in the economic reviews and in the proceedings of learned societies. But to Mr. C. K. Hobson belongs the distinction of writing the first adequate survey of the subject. His book is a severely technical essay, restrained and tentative as such pioneer work should be in its expressions of opinion, and cautious in its approach to aspects of the theme which raise political questions. It is a patient and thorough achievement, ingenious in its handling of statistical material, and much research has gone to the making of its historical chapters. It stands for the present alone as a comprehensive study of an immensely important subject, and lays a foundation on which others may build. If we are ever in this country to attain a scientific view of foreign policy, it must take as one of its chief themes, perhaps the chief, the reaction upon diplomacy and armaments of the immense export of capital which is now the key to our relations with so many undeveloped countries.

The history of Great Britain as a creditor country begins for practical purposes with the close of the Napoleonic wars. The Dutch were our predecessors in the supply of capital to foreign countries. There was, indeed, before the French Revolution, more Dutch money invested in England than there was English money invested abroad. Our own national debt absorbed our savings while the struggle lasted, and export began on a large scale about 1815. The field was comparatively narrow at first, and for some decades Western Europe and the United States were its most important areas. British money and even British labor were long busied in building the French railways. As first France, and then the United States, began to compete with us, the field widened, and from the 'eighties of last century it was becoming world-wide. The movement is steadily outwards, and the more distant and less developed countries assume yearly a relatively larger place in the distribution of our investments. This movement of capital corresponds roughly to the growth of Imperialism. To the possessing classes the ends of the earth are steadily becoming important sources of their fortune. In 1870, the year's export of capital stood a little over 31 millions, and the estimated income from abroad at 44 millions. In 1912 the export had reached the gigantic figure of 226 millions, and the income must be approximately 176 millions.

What have been the social effects of this immense export of capital? Mr. Hobson makes a rather sharp distinction between the immediate effects, and the wider consequences that may make themselves felt over the course of a century. The direct consequences clearly include much grave mischief. Capital is exported when it is tempted by a higher rate of interest abroad. The first effect of its migration is to diminish the supply of capital at home, and therefore to maintain interest at a high level. In point of fact, home rates of interest have risen in recent years by about 30 per cent., and this must in great part be due to the volume of the flood of exported capital. The capitalist, in consequence, secures a larger share of the national output. He bargains from a stronger position against labor, and real wages fail to rise. It is true that the national income is increased by the interest which flows in from abroad, and this in turn creates a demand for services. But these are chiefly luxury services, and make for the employment of crowds of gardeners, keepers, chauffeurs, and servants. The export of capital means in the first place, to quote Mr. Hobson, that "the rate of interest on the capital which remains at home will tend to rise, and a larger proportion of the diminished home output will go to capital." Of the home output, "work-people *qua* work-people" will get a smaller share, and "will probably be worse off than before."

The present injury is clear and serious from the standpoint of the masses. On a long survey, however, Mr. Hobson is satisfied that even the working classes derive a balance of

gain from the process. They share in the increase of real wealth which exported capital brings about by the development of new countries, and are the gainers by the cheapening of commodities which has followed from it. But over a brief period, say the last ten or fifteen years, it is fairly certain that they are losers. The balance-sheet is not easy to draw up, and some considerations might be urged against the optimism of Mr. Hobson's view. Much depends on the use to which the exported capital is put. There is no increase of the world's real wealth, for example, when capital is exported to finance wars and other wasteful expenditure. The interest comes home to benefit the investor and the dependents on his luxury, but there is no eventual cheapening of commodities, as there is when capital goes out to build railways or to create plantations. Nor is the ultimate general benefit clear when the capital goes out to create artificial industries abroad within the close fence of a tariff wall. In this latter case something is being produced more dearly abroad which might have been made more cheaply at home. The whole process, as one leaves Mr. Hobson's survey, raises two practical issues. How far are we entitled to sacrifice the present to the future? Is it always wise to face a present disadvantage for the sake of a remote benefit? Is not the accumulation of capital altogether too rapid, and is not the injury to home production so serious, and its reaction upon the distribution of wealth so mischievous, that some measure ought to be considered to regulate and check the export, by means of a differential tax against incomes derived from abroad? In the second place, ought there not to be some system of control by which foreign investments which do not add to the real wealth of the world should be discouraged, in the interest of such exports of capital as do directly serve the general good?

The case for regulation is only slightly touched in Mr. Hobson's valuable essay. It rests morally, to our thinking, primarily on the part which diplomacy has in recent years assumed in protecting, and even promoting, exports of capital to semi-civilized countries. When one finds that an Embassy has been engaged in assisting a group of financiers to secure a railway concession in China, it is clear that the national resources are being used to further private trading. The Empire, in short, has gone into this business. Behind the diplomatist there is the navy, and behind the competition to secure fields of "influence" and monopoly, there is the whole modern competition for a Balance of Power which is ultimately a balance of armaments. Spheres are allotted and areas of exploitation marked out among the Great Powers, not so much by the final process of bargaining, as by the long years of strain, the tension of the armed peace which commonly precedes the conclusion of an understanding. The more clearly it is realized that State action, through diplomacy which has the sanction of costly force behind it, is in the modern world essential for the success of a great part of this economic penetration, the more does it seem axiomatic that the whole process ought to be regulated for the general good. Some of these investments represent sheer waste. The degree in which the rest of them make for the diffusion of wealth varies indefinitely. Some tend to the enslavement and degradation of "lower" races, and others as certainly to their development. There is a strong case for discrimination among exports of capital, and for the creation of some machinery, subject to democratic control, by which the support and protection of the State may be granted or withheld on principles which can be avowed and defined.

OUR RAILWAYS.

"Outlines of Railway Economics." By DOUGLAS KNOOP. (Macmillan. 5s. net.)

"Men and Rails." By ROWLAND KENNY. (Unwin. 6s. net.)

MR. KNOOP, by casting a course of lectures recently delivered to university students and railwaymen into this volume, performs a very opportune service. Very properly, he begins with some chapters setting forth the operation of the forces on the supply side and the demand side which regulate prices in general, and then proceeds to apply those laws to the special circumstances of a semi-monopolistic industry such as railroads. It is, however, a pity that his economic orthodoxy is so strict as to lead him into a needless endorse-

ment of a law of increasing returns which, as he incidentally recognizes, sheds no light on railway (or, indeed, any other) problems. The critical practical issues in all business life lie in the area of diminishing returns. The most valuable part of Mr. Knoop's book is the careful description and analysis of the actual policy of railways as regards combination and competition, and in the fixing of rates. The methods of differential charging for different sorts of traffic, in relation to the various causes affecting supply and demand, are very accurately reasoned out. The writer shows clearly the insuperable obstacles to any scientific system of special cost-making for particular services, or of dividing general expenses "equally" among different units of traffic.

Bearing in mind the different and ever-changing degrees of "monopolistic" power held by a given railway over different parts of its traffic, in relation to legal restrictions, on the one hand, direct or indirect competition on the other, it is easily perceived that rate-fixing cannot be either scientific or strictly "fair" or "reasonable." The company will try to charge "what the traffic will bear," so far as the rules of the game allow. Mr. Knoop holds that, "although railway charges have been fixed by practical men feeling their way step by step, with little or no reference to theoretical considerations, the system of charging so built up conforms to certain principles, just as a boy who learns to ride a bicycle without any lessons and in ignorance of all physical laws, will, by experience, come to ascertain his balance in accordance with sound principles." We wonder. Competition must tend to keep a business firm fairly straight upon prudential lines. But with monopoly and quasi-monopoly there is no such guarantee. We know, for instance, that most English railways are woefully defective in their method of accountancy, not even attempting the performance of the elementary duty of working out ton-mile figures. Here, as elsewhere, Mr. Knoop appears to us unduly favorable to railway management. Discussing, for instance, the charge that home produce is discriminated against in favor of foreign, he says: "It is because home consignors fail to comply with the conditions in which the special rates are granted." But are they normally in a position to comply, if it be true, as the writer observes a few pages before, that "it is competition, in some form or other, which lies at the back of most special rates"? On State regulation, Mr. Knoop sees a disposition to press unfairly on the railways. But the net effect of State action in recent years has been to raise the profits of railways. Mr. Knoop nowhere adequately recognizes the magnitude of the danger of combination and monopoly in this fundamental industry. Nationalization, he perceives truly enough, would be likely to disappoint the hopes of those who want simultaneously lower rates, better services, higher wages, and a large public revenue. But he weights unduly the case against nationalization on certain counts, especially in regard to political corruption. He ignores the influence which private owners of railways have always exercised upon the course of legislation in this country.

Mr. Rowland Kenny's "Men and Rails" comes as a very strong contrast and a necessary supplement to Mr. Knoop's treatment; for it looks at the railways generally from the workers' standpoint, one which is almost entirely ignored in the academic treatment. As Mr. Kenny was himself for some years a railway worker in various capacities, he has much first-hand knowledge of the conditions of labor. He shows that they are what might indeed be expected in monopolistic businesses, where public control has very little opportunity of regulating such important items as wages, hours, and personal safety. Though various "returns" have been made showing the scandalously low pay and long hours of large numbers of workers, no adequate reforms take place. The "real" wages of most grades have been falling in recent years, and Mr. Kenny shows the statement, for which Mr. Sidney Webb was once brought to book, that about 100,000 adult men were getting no more than £1 a week, to be justified by statistics. A clear and well-informed account is given of the difficulties and the progress of trade unionism, and a useful history of the great strike of 1911, and of its economic and political sequelae, shows how potent are the "railway interests" in their influence on Parliament and the Government. Mr. Kenny favors nationalization, but upon a basis of Guild Socialism, which, so far as we

understand it, might establish a labor monopoly as oppressive to the body of the people as the present unsatisfactory régime.

A BAG OF NOVELS.

- "John Barleycorn." By JACK LONDON. (Mills & Boon. 6s.)
 "Hardware." By KINETON PARKES. (Unwin. 6s.)
 "Wild Honey." By CYNTHIA STOCKLEY. (Constable. 6s.)
 "The Son-God Girl." By THEODORE FLATAU. (Holden & Hardingham. 6s.)
 "Penrod." By BOOTH TARKINGTON. (Hodder & Stoughton. 6s.)

LOOKING at the modern novel in perspective, good and bad, spontaneous and manufactured, one is struck by its pursuit, at any cost of feeling and at any sacrifice of art, of sensation. Now, by sensation, we do not imply the transpontine, the melodramatic, or the criminal flavor. That kind of thing is incidental to all periods of literature, especially to a time like the present, when the reading capacity is as extensive as its taste and discrimination are rudimentary. But this quest for sensation is at once more subtle and more dangerous. After all, the element of mere savagery in it is only an unkempt backyard of life. People like to go there and sit in its grime; but it is not their normal environment. Few novelists have, in fact, adapted this illusion of sensation to all the fluctuations of the human barometer; they are laying the whole world of human intelligence and emotion, so to speak, under an embargo of sensation. Psychology, art, morality, are exploited, not for their own sake, but for the sake of extracting various sensations out of them. The appeal of art, you may say, is, in essence, a highly sensitized and selected sensation of pleasure, and life without sensation is a battery without its electricity. But it is important to remember that the sensation in this case is the product, the dependent of the art, the psychology, or the morality; whereas the modern novel tends to reverse the syllogism and to make sensation the paramount force, for which pseudo-psychology is only the excuse. And such methods can but pervert the meaning of life.

Mr. Jack London's rather fresh and entirely readable book, "John Barleycorn," is a good example of this tendency. It is simply and crudely the autobiography of a drunkard—of a self-conscious, moralizing, and, within limits, imaginative drunkard. We say within limits, because Mr. London's excesses are conceived less in the imaginative than the romantic spirit. He tells us, repeatedly and emphatically, that he never was, and never became, a constitutional alcoholic. The actual taste of drink was repulsive to him. And, when not relating his Bacchic adventures, he spends most of his time in trying to explain exactly why John Barleycorn held him in thrall. It was fatalism, he says, and curiosity; yes, and, above all, sociability. It was "a matter of social intercourse"—a way of achieving an intimate and desperate fellowship with "chesty sea-rovers" and dogs of hardy, generous, filibustering calibre. Observe the analogy with Mr. Chesterton's ideals. Beer for the one, whisky and cocktails for the other, are symbols of the adventurous attitude to life. They are the pirates of romance, with the sign of the Jolly Beer-Bottle nailed to the mast-head. Liquor is to them what the Renaissance was to the Elizabethans—not an end in itself, but an impulse to discovery, color, initiative, everything that is the antithesis of the pedagogic and mechanical. But here their ways part. For Mr. London simply dedicates this romanticism to sensation. He would say, in his bluff and hearty manner, that he devoted it to morals; he says, indeed, that he wrote "John Barleycorn" in order to hasten the issue of a universal Prohibition Order. And there can be no doubt of his sincerity. But what he actually achieves is a sensational tract, a mighty Salvation Army testament, enforced by all the picturesque ritual of gesture and illustration at his command.

Mr. Parkes's "Hardware" is altogether an exception to this merchandize of sensations. It is an ambitious book, attempting to gather within its scope, not only a number of diversified and faithfully observed characters, but the activities of a Midland town, developing a municipal self-consciousness. And it is an honest book—honest because it

refuses to be tempted from the path of sober and conscientious analysis by any irrelevant sentiment and surrender to fashionable canons. The best part of it is concerned with the town, of which it gives a broad, lucid, and almost epic impression. Nor is there any pretence at hero and heroine worship. The heroine has fine and passionate feelings, vitiated into idle discontent by her parents, who are the very worst products of a vulgar industrialism. The hero is mild, disinterested, capable—and priggish. What is wrong with the book is its method of treatment. This method has a way of rumbling over its material like a steam-roller. The fine delicacies, the balanced adjustments, the fastidious values and discernments of artistic selection, it will have nothing whatever to do with. It simply shoots out what it has to say like so many lumps of coal. It does not even know how to present "a huge, inauspicious amount" with a common orderliness. The material is plastered down with a kind of stolid, doughy, British wastefulness and heaviness, which makes the mind dwell on lead and iron, broken bricks, and lumber, lying helter-skelter in a disused field of odds-and-ends. Thus are so many potentially good and serviceable ideas spoiled and even ruined.

With Miss Cynthia Stockley's "Wild Honey" we are back once more to that electric-power station where shocks and thrills and sensations are provided wholesale at a deposit of six shillings. All Miss Stockley's resources of style have been trained and subordinated to these effects. The most inconsiderable incident is puffed up by inflations of language. The episodes (the book is a collection of short stories with a South African setting) are constructed on the same principles; to supply, that is to say, shocks—of surprise, of horror, of extravagance, of incredulity, of violence and of passion—to a jaded system. That is obviously the theory on which the author bases her stories. If she did not conceive her readers as mentally and emotionally depressed, why apply these crudely spiced and acrid stimuli? No; the popular author is also a practised druggist.

At first blush we should have taken "The Sun-god Girl" for an account of the afternoon walk of a precocious young woman, seeking eligible young men with whom to philander, as riskily as her shallow temperament dared. How prosaic we are! For the publisher tells us that he would like to emphasize the underlying symbolism of the Sun-god Girl as Fortune. "We believe," he adds, "that this volume introduces into English literature what has hitherto been considered almost an impossibility: words that sing in phrases that may only be justly termed *spirituelle*. That is to say, the capturing of the French sparkle and *esprit*." The allegorical conversation employed by the "Sun-god Girl" and her followers being almost entirely unintelligible to the plain mind, we were temporarily at a loss to unriddle these symbolic mysteries. At last, however, recognizing the complex significance of simple things, we discovered the formula. Like Wordsworth's celandine, it lay revealed in the prefix "a=." Hardly a page but is bedecked with this simple-seeming anagram. Here are a few (a small minority) of the words to which this insidious prefix has attached itself—"atwitch," "aslow," "awander," "adrum," "adone," "afounder," "apurpose," "acaper," "aclutch," "awhisper," "atwain," "ared," "asteady," "athunder," "asmother," "ahigh," "asearch," "awhiles," "asilent," "aflutter," "asoft," "adream," and "atremor." Now we understand why the men and women in the book talk like this:—

"He put his arm up, then down, and they watched the bay horse devour gold beauties very very closely; and the Cynic did not look thoroughly cynical. '—it will also serve to ker-rush your tip-toe heart. And I am bitterly impatient.—' 'Do you know what happened to a man who was impatient?' asked the Sun-Girl, feeling very glad to be rid of the hard, knobby bit. 'He leaped before he looked.' The Cynic leaned forward, and took two topaz eyes into the arms of two hazel eyes until they all four dropped to the ground with a noise like heart-beats. Then he said: 'And do you know what happened to a woman who leaped before she looked? . . . She jumped to conclusions—which was the name of a little, slippery islet in the middle of a sea of fog!' 'And do you know that a man who jumped to conclusions fell, and sprained his sense of

humor, and became a Cynic?' And she gurgled inside her, and hugged her laughy soul with all her mind and heart." Now we understand the symbol of the prefix "a=" and these expressions of rose-bud sensations. It is Culture.

"Penrod" is a rough-and-ready, semi-farcical attempt to describe the sensations of a small boy in an advanced stage of imaginative rascality. We are tired of the sensations of adults, and it is a welcome experiment. And if we cannot have psychology, we must put up with its substitute. Penrod is so outrageous in his misdemeanors, and his diction is so spotted with the succulent currants of American slang, that the tale of his achievements is practically a burlesque. But, though we weary of his *gamineries*, his creator's heady, boisterous masculinity is, up to a certain point, infectious.

BOOKS IN BRIEF.

"How to See the Vatican." By DOUGLAS SLADEN. (Kegan Paul. 6s. net.)

THIS volume contains the chapters on the collections of pictures, statuary, manuscripts, and other treasures in the libraries and galleries of the Vatican, reprinted with some additions from Mr. Sladen's former book, "The Secrets of the Vatican." Mr. Sladen begins with a historical account of the Vatican from the time of Pope Symmachus, and after a brief description of such famous places as the Sistine Chapel and the Sculpture Galleries, he takes his readers into parts of the Vatican that are not generally shown to the public. His aim throughout the book has been to give the traveller who goes to Rome for sight-seeing, and the stay-at-home who has to do his sight-seeing in books of travel, some idea of the parts of the Vatican which are not generally seen, either because the visitor does not know where to look for them, or because they are only shown as a special favor. This is an interesting as well as a useful task, and Mr. Sladen has performed it with conspicuous success.

* * *

"Remarkable Women of France." By Lieutenant-Colonel ANDREW HAGGARD. (Stanley Paul. 16s. net.)

THERE are over a score of biographies in Colonel Haggard's volume, his heroines ranging from Joan of Arc to Madame de Pompadour and from Madame Guyon to the Marquise de Brinvilliers. The author is a seasoned purveyor of books about women whose virtues or vices have won them fame or notoriety, and the present volume differs mainly from its predecessors in that, in Colonel Haggard's words, it "gives more intimate sketches of the remarkable women who, by their direct or reflex action," either ruled the rulers of France, or, "by their talents, profligacies, and extravagances" had an influence on the course of public affairs. Judged merely as a piece of book-making, the volume is a fair specimen of its kind, but it cannot be regarded as a serious contribution to French history.

* * *

"The Doges of Venice." By MRS. AUBREY RICHARDSON (Methuen. 12s. 6d. net.)

To compress the lives of one hundred and twenty rulers and the essence of over a thousand years of Venetian history into a book of less than four hundred pages, is something of an achievement. It says much for Mrs. Richardson's skill that, in spite of this limitation of space, she has been able to give life and color to her narrative. A book which includes such careers as those of Marino Faliero, Dandolo, Francesco Foscari, and Andrea Contarini, cannot lack romance, and Mrs. Richardson does full justice to these themes. From Pauluccio Anafesto, who was created the first Doge of Venice in 700, down to Ludovico Manin, who yielded to Napoleon's firmness in 1797, the narrative covers the whole history of Venice. Mrs. Richardson is to be congratulated on having written the first consecutive account of these rulers who have played so great a part in history and in romance.

The Week in the City.

SINCE last week, it cannot be said that business sentiment has improved. The effect of the guarantee given to the Bank of England to enable it to discount pre-moratorium bills without loss has become visible in a rush to lodge these bills at the Bank. So great has the pressure been that every morning the officials at the Bank have been compelled by physical necessity to refuse to take further bills until they have been able to get through those already sent in. It is supposed that the loss to the taxpayer involved in the privileged treatment of banks and discount houses will run up to tens of millions sterling, even if the war should last but a few months. A real trouble is that British and German trade are closely entangled. The two countries were necessary to each other in commerce and finance, and the notion that by ruining Germany and capturing German ships and private property at sea you can make English trade flourish, is not shared by practical business men. There are very large districts in England which owe their business to German customers, and other large districts which owe their business to imports from Germany. German dyes and chemicals and special kinds of machinery are very necessary to the prosperity of many British trades. Many British citizens will lose heavily through the numerous captures of German merchant ships which are being announced daily in the newspapers. It is said that British manufactures will take the place of German manufactures in neutral markets. That will be the case to a certain extent. But, unfortunately, neutral markets have also shrunk. With the exception of the United States and India, we hardly know of any important country which has not adopted a moratorium, making it impossible to exact legal payment for debts. Moreover the moratorium at home introduces an element of suspicion and distrust into ordinary business. On the whole, the general view seems likely to be correct, that trade and finance must be expected to be poor so long as the war lasts, the only consolation being that our allies and enemies, thanks to conscription, are very much worse off.

THE STOCK EXCHANGE.

A proof of the state of trade is afforded by the fact that the only securities for which there seems to be any demand are those of Vickers and other armament firms, which are, of course, working overtime, and presumably coining money, and likely to continue doing so during the whole currency of the war. It hardly seems likely that the Stock Exchange will open unless the Chancellor of the Exchequer carries his guarantee policy from Threadneedle Street to Throgmorton Street, and agrees to remove the embarrassments of the leading brokers and dealers by adding them to the National Debt. One cannot help wishing that the Stock Exchange Committee would agree to suspend the rules, and reopen the markets on a restricted scale for cash transactions.

THE NEW CURRENCY.

A correspondent writes:—The public is taking quite kindly to the substitution of £1 and 10s. notes for coin; but

those responsible for the issue must handle the matter very carefully if they wish to avoid running our banking system into even greater difficulties than those which even now beset it. In the first place, the Treasury must avoid all appearance of any desire to force the notes into circulation. There is plenty of gold in the country to meet all internal requirements, even allowing for the extra amount which may have been required because some nervous individuals have preferred not to accept cheques in payment of accounts. It was understood that the issue of small notes was authorized for the purpose of meeting any possible run on the banks when they reopened after the extended Bank Holiday, and in so far as the knowledge that they were available may have eliminated the thought that there was "not enough money to go round," they have served—and are still serving—a useful purpose. But in order that they may fall into no disrepute, the banks and post offices must not try to force them upon the public to the exclusion of gold coin altogether. The notes depend for their convertibility upon the Bank of England's reserve, and in so far as they supplant the Bank of England note, there will be gold available to keep them convertible. But if they are issued in large numbers as additional currency, without any reserve beyond the credit of the Government, that credit is being risked in an unwise manner. A loan by the issue of forced currency appears to be a cheap way of raising money, but it sometimes proves costly afterwards. Such at least has been the experience of many nations who have experimented with paper currencies without proper safeguards. There can be no doubt as to the convenience of paper as a means of currency—the cheque is a sufficient proof of that; but, then, in the case of the cheque, we manufacture whatever currency we need on the strength of our individual credit, and, incidentally, such currency is always new and clean. Paper which has been passed from hand to hand for some time assumes a rather uninviting appearance. The power of the new notes to resist wear has not had time to be tested; but the postal orders which have been pressed into service to provide more small change are proving unequal to much handling. Most of the banks are handing all that are paid into them straight over to the Post Office, but others are using them as till-money. This plan is objectionable, as the paper will not stand much wear, and while branch post offices refuse to give coin for postal orders the banks are performing a useful service in handing over dirty postal orders.

AN EXTRAORDINARY PROSPECTUS.

A most extraordinary prospectus appeared in one or two newspapers at the beginning of this week. It offered £50,000 out of a total capital of £200,000 in 5s. shares in a concern called the Anglo-French Oilfields. Only an abridged prospectus was advertised, and that gave no banker's name upon it. It promised a 6 per cent. "guarantee" on the shares pending development: but the means of securing its payment were missing. The company, it was stated, would acquire 250 acres of freehold land in Algeria; but, beyond saying that "the area" in which it is situated "had been favorably reported on by experts," there was no suggestion that oil might be found within 100 miles of the property. It seems that the promoters had registered the company just before the present trouble broke out, and presumably the advertisement is a forlorn effort in the hope of getting back the money they have spent. The investor has a better use for his money than this in ordinary times.

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